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PREFACE 
Subscribing to the concept that historical research helps us un-
derstand today's world, I have examined five rebellions of colonial 
Brazil to demonstrate that the contemporary Brazilian army's political 
activity finds precedence in colonial reality. Not claiming to be ex-
haustive nor conclusive, the study purports merely to suggest that the 
much-heralded c~vilian tradition of Brazilian society presents a dis• 
torted and inadequate picture of Brazilian history. 
I wish to extend many thanks to the reference librarians of the 
Fourth Floor of the Oklahoma State University Library for their pa-
tient and valuable help. I express equal gratitude to the staff of 
the Interlibrary Loan Department, Second Floor of the Oklahoma State 
University Library, not only for their invaluable service so good-
naturedly lent, but also for the few good laughs we shared. Dr. Michael 
M. Smith, assistant professor of history, Oklahoma State Univ~rsity, 
willingly gav~ his time and opinions for which I am grateful. I also 
want to recognize the other two members of.~ committee, Dr. George F. 
Jewsbury and Dr. 'Neil Hackett. 
Above all, the warm encouragement and substantial contributions 
made by~ parents, Leo F. and Alice J. Brown, not only allowed me to 
_finish this study, but to find my way in my .own way. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Importance of the Brazilian Military 
The present interest in the political role of the military is time-
ly and relevant. In the past fifteen years military leaders in many of 
the developing countries--Brazil, Peru, Chile, Somalia, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Afghanistan and Portugal, to name only a few--have assumed the powers 
and responsibilities of civil gQverrunent. Many s'cholars have examined 
the reasons and historical antecedents of this phenomenon. Their stu-
dies provide valuable information about the processes of modernization, 
industrialization and defense of developing societies. As the develop-
ing third world gains more confidence in itself and.begins to assert 
itself more, the developed countries will have to readjust to the new 
reality and seek to understand it through historical study. 
Brazil, the fifth largest country in size and population in the 
world, ranks as perhaps the most important Latin American country in 
relation to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, Africa and the South 
Atlantic. It is also vital to the economic development of Latin Amer-
ica as a region.1 To understand what has made the a~ Brazil's politi-
cally dominant force, therefore, is very important. 
Many scholars believe that the Brazitian coup of ~·Ch 31, 1964, 
represented a change in the military's traditional role in politics from 
1 
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one of moderation of power to one of active execution.2 Alfred Stepan, 
in a report for the State Department, declared that, "The accession of 
military ••• Liovernmen!7 ••• in Brazil in 1964 ••• marked the end of ••• a 
traditional /role7 for the military in politics and the emergence of a 
- -
new one."J 
Stepan referred to the concept of the moderating power (poder moder-
~) that was embodied in the first Brazilian constitution of 1824. The 
poder moderador posited all real political power in the person of the Em-
peror who had the power to dissolve parliament, call new elections and 
form new cabinets at hi6 discretion. Pedro I, the first emperor of Bra-
zil, and his son, Pedro II, employed the moderating power to balance op-
posing political groups in their battles for legislative eupremae.y. 
Colonial practice, however, reveals a different situation. The Portu-
guese military legacy and the exigencies of colonial Brazil's defensive 
requirements dictated that one man exercised both civil and military 
commands. Samuel da Costa, a Brazilian military historian,. explains 
this tradition by stating that 
the participation of the military in the political life of 
the country constitutes a phenomenon whose historical ori-
gins are intertwined with the very origins of nationality, 
in an interlocking relationship that, far from diminishing, 
has, with the time, grown stronger and stronger.4 
Da Costa thus subscribes to the theory of continuity in the histo-
rical development of institutions a.nd traditions. He believes that 
past events, antecedents, policies and realities form national insti-
tutions and determine their contemporary roles, even though the country 
may outwardly change its form of government and experience what some 
historians call "revolutions". The Brazilian military's predominant 
political role has roots in the colonial past--in the very beginning 
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of Brazilian history--not at some subsequent state. That idea ex-
presses a basic assumption underlying this study--that evolutionary 
processes, not revolutionary ones, dominate the development of insti-
tutions. 
Theory of Continuous Historical Development 
Ma~ American scholars of Brazil believe that when the military-
civilian coalition deposed Pedro II in 1889 and founded the Brazilian 
Republic, the army fell heir to the poder moderador formerly reserved 
to the Emperor. The army did indeed function as the political power 
broker from 1889 to 1963, backing various civilian groups in their bids 
for political supremacy. Those Who do recognize, however, the incom-
patibility between the popular concept of a dominant civilian tradition 
and Brazil's present political situation maintain that the Brazilian 
army's active participation in politics dates from the Paraguqyan War 
period of 1864-187o5 or perhaps from the earlier struggles for inde-
pendence and consolid;:Jtion from 1822 to 1848.6 
This pla.cement of the origin of tpe army's interest and action in 
politics at a relatively late date? does not satisfy those students of 
Brazilian history who subscribe to the concept of continuity of histor-
jcal development. They would claim that the traditions of any national 
unit or institution originate, not in the immediate past, but during the 
period of national formation. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to 
·conclude that the traditions, characteristics and attitudes that govern 
the contemporary Brazilian army's actions developed during the colonial 
period. 
The American historian's subscription to the theory of historical 
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discontinuity stems from the work of Frederick Jackson Turner, late 
19th century American historian. The philosophical concept of discon-
tinuous historical development supports his hypothesis that the frontier, 
not European cultural heritage, determined American character. Criti-
cizing Turner, revisioriist historians such as L9W1SHanke claim that 
European antecedents influenced American development much more vitally 
than the new frontier element. Although Brazilian military and social 
historians8 recognize the colonial Brazilian martial tradition, Ameri-
can historians have treated Brazilian history a la Turner, ignoring 
the colonial antecedents of the military's political activity. The colo-
nial antecedents constitute a legacy which historians cannot minimize 
without risking a serious distorition of Brazilian histor.1. 
Definitions 
The Brazilian army, as aQy institution, reflects national realities. 
The military action of 1964 was not taken by the General Humberto Cas-
tello group without civilian support. These "hardliners", a circle with-
in the top-ranking Brazilian officers, had ties to certain dominating 
civilian groups which approved and encouraged military intervention in 
politics. Ronald Schneider, American politic~l scientist and student of 
the modern Brazilian army, interprets the actions of these groups as a.n 
attempt to protect the bureaucratic middle class against the incorpora-
tion of the Brazilian rural and urban proletariats into the political, 
social and economic life of the nation, The tie between the politically 
ac~ive Brazilian army and a civilian group which felt itself threatened 
was not a new situation, It was merely the latest in a long series 
of coalitions, begun at colonization, formed between military and civilian 
groups in Brazil. 
The Brazilian army of 1964 revealed another characteristic--
regionalism--which has its roots in colonial times. The officers 
would like to think that the a~ is the only truly national insti-
tution in Brazil.9 They still employ, however, the traditional 
method of local recruitment and garrisoning which limits the nation-
Rlization of units. The traditional problem of regionalism, there-
fore, still limits the effectiveness of national programs.10 
A third characteristic which helped politicize the Brazilian 
military classes in colonial times was their ethnic composition. It 
is difficult 'to ascertain the racial characteristics of the modern 
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Brazilian army, since the existence of racial prejudice and the status 
of blacks and mulattoes is a subject not pleasing to Brazilians. Gil-
berto Freyre, the eminent Brazilian social historian, declares that for 
years the Brazilian army's officers have been largely mulatto and even 
black.11 The mass of Brazilian soldiers probably reflects the general 
characteristics of the whole Brazilian population which, although by 
changing the racial definitions census-takers have made the population 
appear "whiter anri whiter" each year, is predominantly mulatto. Freyre 
postulates that 
the political activity, in the revolutionary sense, of the 
militias or the Brazilian army, so unquiet and intrepid ••• 
perhaps has been, in part, another expression of the mul-
atto, more intelligent rnd sensitive, still badly adjusted 
to the social milieu ••• 2 
Donald Pierson, a noted American Brazilianist, cites a racial study 
made in Bahia in 19.36. Data concerning .5,943 persons revealed that 
mixed bloods were more numerous that whites among government 
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functionaries and retail clerks. They were also present in substantial 
numbers among prieta, university professors, teachers, physicians, law-
yers and politicians. This study perhaps clarifie~ somewhat the close 
contemporary relationship between the arnw officers and the middle 
classes in which mulattoe~ either dominate or appear in substantial 
11 numbers. -
With the preceeding considerations in mind, one might suspect 
that the Brazilian army's contemporary political domina.nce has antecedents· 
in the colonial period. It is the thesis of this study that regional 
characteristics, a specific ethnic composition and alliances with dis• 
~ffected middle groups politicized the colonial Brazilian military 
classes, giving rise to a. tradition of political activity among them. 
The purpose of this stuqy is to analyze the functional role of the 
colonial Brazilian military classes in five colonial rebellions in 
order to support the thesis statement. 
The thesis statement uses four terms--colonial Brazilian military 
classes, regional characteristics, specific ethnic composition and 
disaffected middle groups--that perhaps require brief definition at 
the beginning. These definitions will be necessarily limited because 
the exposition of the thesis statement will provide the expanded de-
finition and clarification of the individual terms. 
Since Brazil remained a Portuguese colony until 1808 it would be 
improper to speak of a "colonial Brazilian army." This writer, there-
for, has chosen the term colonial Brazilian military classes. Because 
of the scarcity of Portuguese men to complete the garrisons throughout 
the far-flung Portuguese Empire, Portuguese imperial officials in Braz-
il necessarily relied on natives or those born in Brazil to complement 
what was usually only a small detachment of Portuguese officers. A 
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dichotomy, therefore, developed early in Bra::dlian history--a Portu-
guese officer corps, basically white or European in composition, and a 
native or Brazilian soldiery which exhibited a mixed racial heritage. 
Portuguese policy barred native-born Brazilians from the officer rank 
until 1774. After that date-discrimination based not only on color but 
also on nationality prevented the rise of Brazilians to the officer 
corps. The colonial Brazilian military classes thus included those non-
commissioned officers and the mass of native-born soldiers serving 
under Portuguese officers. These groups were comprised of mixed bloods 
and Amerindians who, because of their special marginal status in a 
slave economy, had leisure time and hired themselves out as,mercenaries. 
The thesis statement also indicates that the colonial Brazilian 
military classes exhibited a certain regional characteristic that helped 
to politicize them. The nati~e-born soldiers serving under Portuguese 
officers in colonial Brazil usually remained in the immediate geograph-
ical region from which they were recruited. This was especially true 
of the militias or second-line troops recruited locally by the area's 
big land owners. The first liners, or those serving under Portuguese 
officers, were somewhat more mobile, but the tradition of serving only 
in one's home area remained strong. The colonial Brazilian ~litary 
classes, then, were interested in the politics of the area in which 
they were serving because that are was usually their native one. The 
practice of stationing soldiers in their native area continues in 
Brazil today. 
The thesis statement claims that the ethnic composition of the 
colonial Braz~lian military classes also contributed to their politi-
cization. It is a contention of this study that most of the politically 
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active Brazilian military elements in colonial times were of mixed ra-
cial origin. They were men of color, not black, not Indian and not 
white, but "marginal men," whose integration into the higher social 
ranks was theoretically possible but in practice was blocked by dis-
criminatory policies of white Portuguese officials, officers and ad-
ministrators. The army provided the initial source of social mobility 
in colonial Brazil; it was the first Brazilian proto-institution out-
side the organized and integrated plantation ~nomy which did not 
limit the status of the individual to two alternatives--master and slave. 
The mulatto or mixed blood had no place within this diohotomr and 
found that the military way of life offered an alternative, albeit 
not a very satisfactory one, to his marginal status on the fringes of 
the latifundia system. The mixed blood had no anchor; he was for hire. 
He first became the mercenary of colonial Brazil, then later a .leader 
in rebellion and independence because he auffered discrimination from 
Portuguese prejudice which limited not only his rise in the ai'IIlY' but 
his integration into Brazilian society. 
The third politicizing element the thesis statement mentions is 
the alliance of the colonial Brazilian military classes with certain 
disaffected civilian middle groups 1.rho required power to implement 
their political goals. The first two incidents examined in this study, 
the Dutch expulsion and the Emboaba affair, involved mercenary military 
classes who were either hired by civilians or previously controlled by 
them. These mercenaries expelled a foreign power and consolidated Por-
tuguese rule (some say Jewish commercial rule) in Minas Gerais, the area 
of gold production. At this time the Brazilian military classes had 
not developed a sense of racial, class or national consciousness, 
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although the civilian groups displayed much more organization and pur-
pose. The last three incidents analyzed in this paper clearly demon-
strate the advanced state of consciousness to which the free mulatto 
Braz~lian soldier, tied to middle groups which were substantially mixed 
in ethnic composition, had risen. A highly developed sense of racial, 
class, economic and national consciousness, the result of Portuguese 
repression, were sharply delineated in the Inconfid~ncia Mineira, 
~ ~ 
the Conjurayao de~ and the Revoluyao Pernambucana of 1817. 
The chronological order employed in this study reveals a deve-
loping sense of nationality on the part of the Brazilian military classes. 
This identity ~ncreased as regional characteristics became more en-
trenched, as racial differences between the native military Brazilian 
classes and the Portuguese officers became more distinct and divisive 
and as certain free civilian groups, reacting to Portuguese oppression, 
created a national and class consciousness. 
The Cultural Approach to History 
The author of this study will utilize the cultural approach to 
support the thesis statement. In 1940 the American Historical Associa-
tion formally recognized the cultural approach to explain historical 
processes by publishing papers read at its meeting of 1939. Introducing 
the volume, editor Caroline F. Ware wrote that 
the pattern of culture conditions individuals, providing 
their basic assumptions and their tools of observation 
and thought ••• It determines the forms of institutions, the 
types of personality which will be ~eloped and the types 
of conduct which will be sanctioned. 
This statement implies the idea that if historians are to explain 
10 
man's development over time and space they must examine the cultural 
matrix, the milieu in which certain processes and institutions ap-
peared. Louis Gottschalk, an eminent American historian, writes that, 
" ••• philosophical systems and sociological laws are the possible means 
. 15 
of discovering the causal relations among historical phenomena." · 
The development of institutions, therefore, cannot be explained or un-
derstood unless there is a broader reference to the state of society 
or culture ln which those institutions appear. The coloniai Brazilian 
military classes reflected the characteristics of colonial Brazilian 
society. This writer will utilize the cultural approach in discussing 
the genesis of the specific ethnic composition, regionalism and the 
growth of certain civilian groups to indicate how ~hese elements in-
fluenced and politicized the colonial Brazilian military classes. 
Certain difficulties are inherent in the cultural approach. Cul-
tural history takes into account those gl'Oups of people who are not· 
usually literate. Written accounts of their lives, sufferings, motives, 
attitudes and goa.ls are not readily available. One must glean these 
from secondary accounts, from others whose class origin may differ 
from the aforementioned groups. From these meager gleanings one 
must then deduce the reality of past occurrences and times. The use of 
sociological and psychological approaches can give meaning to class and 
racial conflict. 
A aeqond difficulty of the cultural approach stems from the dearth 
of statistical information available as supporting evidence. Since 
this thesis involves the ethnic comrosition of colonial Brazilian mili-
tary classes it would be most desirable to have statistical information 
regarding the members of those classes. Unfort:,unately, even figures 
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for the whole colonial Brazilian population are sparse and incomplete. 
Even if such statistics were available, the reliability of the racial 
criterion would remain doubtful because of the ambiguity of racial 
classification in Brazil. Pierson cites a study made in Bahia of 500 
persons classified as white (branco). One third "showed quite evident 
African racial heritage •••• 11 The first Brazilian census in 1872 
·indicated that 39% of the population (3,801,722) were mixed blood. 
The census of 1890 showed a total of six and a half million mixed-
blood Brazilians. The 1970 census-takers received orders to abandon 
all attempts to distinguish color and race.16 
Method 
The methodology of this study requires some explanation. It is 
inductive and analytical. It utilizes specifics to support a gener-
alization. Single events will be analyzed and cited to explain the 
general development of the political tradition of a military insti-
tution.17 It will analyze functional relations in time and space, which, 
acoording to a Dutch philosopher of history, Folke Dovring, are causal 
relations. · This paper, then, attempts to apply the concept of multiple 
causation to an observed phenomenon--the colonial Brazilian military 
classes' predilection for political activity. 
The controversy about the purpose of history lies beyond the 
scope of this paper.l8 Gottschalk's idea, " ••• to have some relation 
to the understanding of contemporary man and his problems ••• "l9 partially 
sat~sfies this writer's criterion •. Though this study is necessarily 
inconclusive and can merely indicate the directions further research 
could take, it does, however, relate relevantly to the criterion of 
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helping to understand contemporary man and his problems. It addresses 
itself to the problem of causation and antecedent that could help ex-
plain a modern human phenomenon--the contemporary Brazilian army's 
political dominance since 1964. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY LEGACY 
The Portuguese Military Situation 1500 
Colonial Brazilian military organization with its regional orien-
tation and relationship with political leaders stemmed-from the Portu-
guese military heritage and from Portugal's preoccupation with her 
.-
Asian empire. ~~en Pedro Alvares Cabral, a Portuguese noble and re-
nowned navigator, discovered Brazil in 1500, Portugal could not field 
an ~rmy. It did not maintain a standing armf nor any permanent, 
paid or professional fighting force. Even when the crusading Portu-
guese King, Sebasti~o I (1568-~) 1 died in battle in Morocco on August 
4, 1578, he fell amidst an a~ recruited for that specific African 
campaign which expected great booty from conque~d Moorish cities.l 
At the beginning of the struggle for the Restoration in 164o2 Joao, 
Duke of Bragan,2a and later Joio III of Portugal, di~posed of no army, 
no navy and no cavalry.3 It is most significa~t that the method to 
which the cartes, the representatives electeq to aig the king as a type 
of proto-parliament, resorted for defense against Spanish retaliation 
follow'd the ancient and medieval traditiqn-•the delegation of defen-
sive responsibility to each province. The defense of each province 
was entrusted to its own recruits.4 
The Portuguese had developed and practiced this concept of regional 
military d~fe~se during their lengthy struggle against the Moors during 
15 
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the Reconquest. The fight between Christian Portuguese and Moslem Moors 
extended over time and space from 714 A.D~ to 1250 when the Algarve (Al-
Gharb or the West in Arabic) fell to Afonso III, and from Guimaraes, 
Afonso III's capital in the north, to the Algar¥e in the south. Some-
times cities exchangoo hands s:Ut or seven times in the 500 years of 
Moslem hegemony. During this time the regional system of organized 
military drafts appeared. Since the feudal system operated in Portugal, 
the king required the various laords to provide soldiers, who, along 
with the king 1 s personal vassals, formed a rnore mobile national offen-
sive group. The municipalities furnished not only contingents of cav-
alry, the knights and riders used for offensive purposes, but also the 
footmen which were drafted mainly for local defense.5 These local units, 
recruited to defend each home area, were, at times, joined to the offen-
sively oriented groups to form the hostia. This enlarged, impermanent 
national army was sometimes transferred to distant areas that might be 
under strong Moorish attack. 
The hostia, however, was always dispersed immediately after the 
specific battle for which it had been recruited had ended.6 No muni-
cipality could be left unguarded for any length of time because of the 
mobility and unpredictability of Moorish units. Portugal, therefore, 
developed no strong tradition of a national army because of the re-
quirements of regional defense. Leaders regarded a national force as 
an impermanent device arrang~d ~o meet a stronger than usual attack by 
the Moors. 
Other factors blocked the formation of a national Portuguese army 
and created public disdain for such an institution. The feudal organ-
:tza.tion of the Portuguese hinterland resisted the application of the 
hostia which required transfer to other regj ons. The ma,ss of Portuguese 
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people developed an antipathy toward and hatred of militar,y recruitment. 
Even in the midst of a struggle to maintain national existence in 1644 
"conscription, billeting and requisitioning caused general discontent."7 
The king, dependent upon merchants who begrudged war expenses, paid the 
national troops miserably. 
The merchant class considered the officers their servants, since 
they paid the militar,y's salaries. Padre Ernesto Sales, an historian 
of Portllgal, states that recruitment in Portugal 
••• was made periodically by unholy levies in which poor, humble, 
unprotected people were selected,.and from which the noble-born, 
the rich and the innumerable privileged groups e-scaped easily 
and quickly. Afterwards, those soldiers, badly clothed, poorly 
fed and miserably paid, were forced to rema~n in the armr years 
and years ••• deserting always and forever ••• 
The Crown also offered alternative employment in lieu of military ser-
vice. After 1640 the kings encouraged grain production and exempted 
farmers from military service upon payment of a fossadeira or military 
tax. Commerce beckoned enterprising adventurers who otherwise-might 
have chosen the military. The impecunious Portuguese king1 s whims and 
empty treasury, not service and ability, ·governed military promotions. 
,., 
The Braganca kings favored those rich enough to buy commissions. Joao. 
"' · Magalhaes, army officer and military historian, states that 
there were no properly fixed rules to govern access to the 
military hierarchy; it all remained dependent upon the king's 
will. In principle, however, it was the officers' right 
to nominate his subordinates.9 
The second characteristic of the Portuguese military legacy appeared 
in pre-Moslem Portugal. This characteristic embodied the concept of the 
unification of civil and military-leadership in one man. This merger of 
~ivil pnd military cormnand, according to Carf.os Selvagem, a Portuguese 
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military historian, is Visigothic in origin. "The king, created by his 
barons to lead in war ••• was, then, the supreme leader who declared and 
executed the war.n10 This practice mirrored Visigothic society " ••• in 
which military service constituted a general civic duty for all free 
men •••• 11 Even in the charters granted to municipalities in 1279 by 
King Dinis (1279-1325) " ••• the responsibilities of the judges were not 
separated from the military and policial responsibilities so that the 
whoe civil process had a.Jllif.itacy•form •••• u~~ .. ~ 
Ordenans;oes Afonsinas 
These two characteristics, regional recruitment and unification of 
civil and military duties found their way to Brazil by application of the 
law code which embodied them--the ordenanqoes afonsinas. The compilation 
of these ordenances required a long and involved process. In 1020 Afonso 
v, king of Castile, united two old law cedes, the Forum Judicum (a com-
" bination of the Codigp Visigotioo and the~~ Livro) and the Liber 
Judicuml3 and renamed the synthesis the Fuero ~ Le~o. In 1279 King 
Dinis of Po~tugal translated into Portuguese the ~ ~ ~ Partidas, 
the first law code ever written in Castillian (by Dinis' grandfather, 
Afonso X) to which he joined the Fuero de Le~o. This combined law 
code served Portugal until 1446 when Jo~o I (1385-1433) of Portugal, at , 
"' the request of the Cortes, reformed and compiled the extant laws. Afonso 
V (1438-81) of Portugal published the reformed compilation in 1.446 and 
called it the ~rdenanc;ges afonsinas. 
The ordenanqbes afonsinas, then, in their method of military or-
ganization, embodied two· characteristics which determined not only the 
type of the Portuguese, but also the character of the colonial Brazilian 
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military organization--local recruitment of solciers for mainly defen-
sive purposes in their home areas and the unification of both civil and 
military command in one leader. Extending the concept to society, a 
citizen was both civilian and soldier. A leader was not only a civilian 
chief, but a military corranander as well. 
Hermes Vieira and Oswaldo Silva, Brazilian military historians, 
state unequivocally that "when Brazil was discovered the ordenancoes 
afonsinas were in full vigor in Portugal."l4 Magalha'es agrees that the 
charter (fora1) of the capitancy (capitahia)of Bahia granted on October 
26, 1.548, involved a direct application of the ordenan2'ies afonsinas.15 
The strength and longevity of the ordenanqoes afonsinas in Brazil, des-
pite attempts to introduce new and modified codes (ordenanrc,oes manuellinas 
1496, ordenanQoes sebastianas 1568, ordenan90e~ fillipinas 1592) were 
demonstrated in 1711. When the French attacked Rio de Janeiro the Portu-
guese governor requested help from Mims Gerais, another colonial Brazi-
lian capitania to the northwest. From Minas came 
••• seven thousand men ••• which had been united in seven days, 
which certainly was accomplished by the prestige of the 
governor of Rio de Janeiro and also becagse there the or-
denanccoes afonsinas still were used •••• 1 
Genesis of Regionalism in Brazil 
The nature of colonial Brazil's early position in the Portuguese 
Empire encouraged the application of the concepts embodied in the or-
Ill denan~es afonsinas. Portugal's world-wide empire included emporia in 
the Atlantic, on the west and east coasts of Africa, in the Persian Gulf, 
on the east and west coasts of India, in what is today Malaysia, Indo-
nesia, China, Japan and in Micronesia. The lucrative trade of the East 
attracted the commercially-minded Portuguese much more than the 
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unoccupied, untilled lands and primitive Amerindians of Brazil. Only 
when the French demonstrated a growing interest in the Platine area did 
Portugal send a colonizer, Martim Afonso de Sousa, to begin a systematic 
defensive effort there. Magalh~es dates Sousa's arriaval in Brazil as 
the beginning of the military and political organization of the colony. 
Brazil's coast line, however, proved too extensive for Sousa to 
defend adequately. The French intensified their efforts to capture the 
northern area of Brazil. The Spanish continued to threaten Portuguese 
control in the Platine area and in 1624 the Dutch attacked the north-
eastern colony of Bihia. Not only Europeans threatened the tenuous 
Portuguese colonizing efforts. Certain Amerindian tribes attacked the 
small settlements and killed all inhabitants. The defense of Brazil's 
extensive coast line and vast interior required more money, men and 
energy than the Portuguese could produce. .. ' ' . r\) Baa1lio Magalhaes, a Brazi• 
I'V _, 
lian historian, explains in his Expansao Geografico ~ Brasil Colonial 
that 
••• the Portuguese treasury, 'bled white by the Indies ••• could 
not support the cost of the system of colonization which con-
sisted in occupying Brazil's coast with military-agriculture 
posts •• ). 7 
With the traditions of regionalism and unification of civil and 
military responsibilities embodied in the ordenancoes afonsinas which 
still dominated Portugal, it is easy to understand why the king intro• 
duced a feudal practice into Brazil to defend its extensive coast line. 
Just as the English Puritan Civil War and Commonwealth from 1640 to 1649 
and the subsequent English preoccupation with domestic affairs forced the 
New England colonies to create a defensive pact based on regional units, 
the Portuguue incapacity and unconcern With Brazilian affairs forced a 
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development of regional independence and feudal defensive structure. An 
excess of old-line nobility appeared in Portugal during the late 15th and 
early 16th centuries because of the transformation of the economy from 
a feudal to a commercial base. The Crown awarded large land grants (cap-
itanias) in Brazil to certain members of this impecunious nobility who 
were invested with the responsibilities of defense an0 development of 
their capitanias. Theoretically the profit reaped from the grants were 
to improve the financial situation of the marginal nobility. The deve-
lopment and defense of the capitanias, however, required a substantial 
initial investment which most of these moneyless lords could not afford. 
Two of these capitanias--Pernambuco in the northeast and Sao Vicente in 
the south--did thrive. The owners (donatarios) made grants of land to 
their colonists and a feudal structure soon evolved. 
The feudal arrangement of J.and ownership facilitated the application 
of the ordenancoes afonsinas. The chartbr of the capitania of Bahia 
granted on October 26, 1548, obligated every colonist to lend military 
service in defense of the colony. ~ Magalhaes believes that this order 
constituted the direct application of the ordenan~oes afonsinas and that 
the military obligation of every citizen was the basis of the Brazilian 
military institution. 18 F. de Paula Cidade, Brazilian military offi-
cer and historian, declares that Brazil's military organization, as 
ordered by the Regimento de 1548, a royal order concerning military or-
ganization, was feudal. The order scattered small military units through- . 
out the capitania, each one obeying the largest land owner. This system, 
Cidade claims, continued to dominate Brazil's imperial and republican 
military organization.19 
The Portuguese king 1 s primary concern about Brazil was defense. The 
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most important consideration,~therefore, was military organization. It 
was based on the concept of a colony-in-arms which reflected the feudal 
arrangement of society. The whole colo~ was organized militarily. 
Article 33 of the charter granted to Martim Afonso de Sousa clearly re-
vealed the leader's military duty and the concept of a colony-in-arms; 
The captains of the captaincies of said lands and the 
senhores of sugar plantations and the colonists of the 
!and shall have the following artillery and arms ••• two 
falcoes, six ber~s and six rneio-bercos and twenty ar-
caSuzes, •• the ae ores of sugar plantations and ranclles 
shaii have at !east ?our beroos and ten espingardas with 
the necessary powd8r1 and ten baestas, and twenty ... etc, 
••• and every colonist of the said lands of Brazil will 
have at least bestas, e~iggardas, espadas, lanQJS, or 
chuxos •• ,those who do not have artillery, powder and 
arms will acquire them, •• 20 
Each land owner in colonial Brazil maintained a small private army for 
defense formed within the walls of his big house (~ lran~).21 
There were two kinds of colonial troops--regular paid troops (tropas 
da linha or first-liners) and auxiliary troops. The latter were divi-
-
ded into two types-~the militia (milrci~~ or second-liners) and the 
ordenances (ordenangas or third-liners or home guard), The second-liners 
included most of the able~odied, free men of the colony who were not 
first-liners, ,1\ The camaras, the local municipal councils, recruited and 
paid the second-liners who were generally mustered to aid the regular 
troops in combat. The third-liners included every male from age 18 to 
60 who was not included in the first or second lines. These men usually 
never received pay although they had to drill once a month, Rarely did 
they accompany the first liners in offensive actions, The local land 
ttwners directly controlled both the second and third lines and in colo-
,. 
r~al Brazil these lines maintained a prominent position, The camaras 
garrisoned the first line locally and therefore maintained some degree 
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of control over them. 22 
Most authors agree that the regular paid troops or the first line 
in Brazil were few and ineffective at least before 1654. Before the 
Dutch war (1645-54) the military force 
••• was constituted by the third line or ordenancas principally 
in which was enlisted all colonists, the richest being of the 
cavalr,r. There were very few first-liners or paid soldiers, 
and only after the Dutch war did th~ become more numerous than 
the second and third lines ••• 23 
Even though the first line became more numerous after 1650, a letter 
from the King to Roque da Costa Barreto, governor-general in 1698, de-
monstrated the importance of the second and third lines. The King or-
dered the governor to drill these lines each month in every locality 
and to carry out capitania~wide musterings three times a year. The 
King ordered that each soldier of the second and third lines carr 
. A 
adequate ams and stipulated that the local camaras, not the royal 
treasury, bear the cost.24 In the southern provinces during the 
struggles over Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina with the Spanish 
the second and third lines provided most of the combat troops, the 
' royal forces entering as complementary forces only.25 B,y the second 
half of the 18th centur., native Brazilians constituted about one-half 
of the first-line ·t~oops. In 1763 the first line of Ric de Janeiro in-
eluded three European infantry regiments, two colonial infantry regiments 
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and a locally formed artillery regiment totally 4,175 soldiers. In 
1768 Bahia boasted of two white infantry regiments, a regiment of_ mul-
attoes and several companies of Indian trcops. 27 
Unification of Civil and Military Command 
The feudal and regional arrangement of land ownership in colonial 
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Brazil reinforced the concept of unification of civilian and military 
command embodied in the ordenancoes afonsinas. Samuel da Costa, aBraz-
ilian military historian, explicitly states that the civil and military 
. 28 functions were united 1.n one person. Election of officers in the mili-
tias and the ordenantas further strengthened this tendency. Those elected 
as officers were the richest and most influential people of the loca1ity 
and therefore had command positions over all male citizens who were ob-
liged to serve in the second or third 1ines. 29 1\ The camaras, controlled 
by the land owners, elected the capit~o-mor, the highest local military 
,., 
officer, and also the sargento-mor, the executive officer. The capitao-
mor chose the adjutants and the captains, who in turn, chose the second 
lieutenants (aiferes) and the sergeants.3° A significant duty of the 
rJ 
capitao-mor required him to uphold the authority of those civil officials 
in power.31 This responsibility further amplified the militar,y-civilian 
relationship. 
The tradition of unifying civil and military comfflands was even more 
clearly apparent in the provinces of Santa Catarina, Parana and Rio 
Grande do Sul. As late as 1811 Jo~o VI, king of Portugal, who was resi-
ding in Brazil, 
•• .ordered Uruguaia.n territory to be invaded by forces 
organized in Rio Grande do Sul under the command of 
Lieutenant-General Dom Diogo de Sousa, who also governed 
the capitania of Rio Grande do Sul.32 
The legacy of Sao Paulo, bandeirantismo33, fol:t.owed the tradition 
of ~ting all power in one man. Nelson Sodrei, an eminent Brazilian 
historian, describes the bandeira and its chief as military in charac-
ter. The chief was at the same time patriarch, legislator, judge and_ 
military co~nder.34 Magalh~es states !lately that in pre-Independence 
Brazil the civil command in the capitanias and the military commands were 
always united. 
Not only did this tradition strongly tie the civil authorities to 
military power, but also allowed politicians to control military offi-
cers and troops. Although the Crown had encouraged this situation in 
early colonial Brazil, it soon recognized that the consequences of such 
practice were disastrous to Portuguese control of Brazil and attempted 
to combat the phenomenon. The Marquis de Pombal, chief minister of 
Portugal from 1750 to 1777, hired a Prussian general to rationalize 
Brazilian military affairs. The Prussian complained to Pombal that 
officers served civilian officials and he dismissed many such officers 
in his reform of Brazilian military.35 The Prussian general referred to 
the long-established role of the military as tax gatherers for civilian 
officials. The Crown farmed out the duties of tax-collecting to certain 
powerful civilians who, in turn, degegated the duty to colleagues who 
disposed of troops. When the royal officials called for arrears the 
military officers, often in conspiracy with the civilian tax-farmers, 
rebelled. This happened in Pernambuco in 1645 and again in Minas Gerais 
in 1789. 
After 17001 when the Portuguese established firmer authority over 
Brazil to control the gold production, the Brazilian military classes 
became further discontented because military promotions for Brazilians 
declined. A royal edict of 1727 ordered that all those born in Br. 
be blocked from promotion beyond the post of.second lieutenant.36 The 
restriction of Brazilian promotions dissatisfied the land owners, since 
their control of troops consequently decreased. F.J. Oliveira Vianna, 
a Brazilian social historian, states that "as the military posts, from 
captain up, were made the monopoly of Portuguese, the rural nobility be-
came discontented, also, and made common cause with the milita.ry."37 
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Reflecting the changing colonial Brazilian power structure and the 
growing complexity and pluralism· of civilian groups, the alignment of 
military classes shifted during the course of colonial history. The 
colonial military classes in the first two rebellions this study will 
examine, the Dutch war and the Emboaba affair, were tied to a newly 
formed landed class that also had semi-commercial functions, such as 
tax-gathering and the sale of food. The last three conflicts analyzed 
in this study--the InconfidGncia Mineira, the Conjil:ra2'8o ~ ~ and 
the Revolu£ao Pernambucana--revealed the development of Brazilian so-
ciety, the growth of Brazilian nationali·~m and a consciousness on the 
part of the military classes of their marginality in the Portuguese 
imperial structure. The military classes' alignment shifted to new 
commercial, artesanal and intelligentsia groups which induced the 
military to utilize its growing power and organization to implement 
mutually-held goals. 
The military traditions embodied in the ordenancc.Ses afonsinas, 
regional recruitment and unification of civil and military command 
in one person, so easily adaptable to the colonial Brazilian feudal 
organization, portended ill for Portuguese hegemony in Brazil. Local. 
recruitment and garrisoning of troops assured that local issues and 
conditions vitally affected the troops. The unification of military 
and civil commands in one man and the close relationship between the 
politicians and the officers meant that any civil uprising would also 
become a military uprising. These traditions assured that military 
leaders would be vitally involved in the political life of the colony~ 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PORTUGUESE SOCIAL. LFnACY; MISCEGENATION 
The Moorish Occupation 
The Portuguese social legacy in Brazil directly contributed to the 
politicization of the colonial Brazilian military classes. The Portu-
guese male's readiness, whether of necessity or preference, to mate with 
women of color created a mestico population in colonial Brazil. This 
population represented a marginal element in colonial Brazil, one that 
found no place within the master-slave dichoto~ which dominated colo-
nial society. This marginal group's attempt at integration into Braz-
ilian society helped politicize the military classes. 
One logical and historical explana:tion of the Portuguese propensity 
to miscegenate states that the somatic norm of the Portuguese people 
was considerably darker than that of other Europeans. The somatic norm 
of a culture is that idealization of the perfect human phenotype or 
physical appearance.1 The Moors, a dark people revealing previous mis-
cegenation with Negro populations, conquered the Iberian Peninsula in 
714 A.D. and ruled the lower two-thirds of what is today Portugal uritil 
1250. They established an advancPd civilization linked to the far-flung 
Moslem empire and stimulated a renaissance in education, science, art 
and mathematics on the peninsula. The Portuguese associated conquest, 
power, prestige and learning with the darker color. In Portugal the 
darker man had conquered and· at times enslaved the whiter man. Color 
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therefore, carried less social stigma than else11lhere in Europe. The Por-
tuguese somatic norm developed under conditions in which the man of color, 
because of his military conquest of Portugal and position of.privilege and 
power, enjoyed high status. 
Gilberta Freyre discusses the dual continentality of the Portuguese, 
refering to their intermediate geographical position between Africa and 
Europe. The Portuguese revival and subsequent conquest of the African 
and Asian coasts strengthened the tradition of miscegenation and further 
encouraged the development of a darker somatic norm-image. On August 21, 
1415, Ceuta, the city which controlled the African side of the Straits of 
Gibraltar, fell to the Portuguese who began their march on Africa. Maga-
z~o fell, followed by West Africa, Mo~ambique and Ormuz in 1507, Goa in 
1510, Bombay in 1534, Malacca in 1558, Macao in 1557 and Funay (Japan) 
in 15P P. The Portuguese established emporia in China and beyond. In 
all these areas Portuguese men mixed wit~ women of color. In each area, 
except Angola, where the women practiced infanticide, a mixed-blood pop-
ulation appeared. The Portuguese ideal of the morena, the most desirable 
and most beautiful of women, a brunette phenotype, not bla.ck and not white 
but rather the caf~ ~ leite, 2 developed. The descriptive term morena, 
therefore, came to have sexual overtones and indicated a woman whose 
physical beauty and sexual prowess made her the most sought after w-
man. It further augmented the miscegenation and helped reinforce the 
darker somatic !).arm-image of the Portuguese. 
\ 
Not only did contact with the Moors and the Moslem world in Africa 
and Asia affect the somatic norm of the Portuguese, but also modified 
their Christian marital traditions. The Islamic tradition of the Moors 
and the other African and Asian countries allowed polygamy. Men le-
gally married as many wives as they could support. The conditions of 
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continuous warfare on the part of the expanding Moslems, including the 
Moors, and later on the part of the expanding Portuguese, created situ-
ations propitious to promiscuity. The Portuguese, consequently, deve-
loped a sexual lasciviousness and insatiety which disregarded marital 
3 bonds and color barriers and facilitated miscegenation. 
Another situation which facilitated miscegenation not cnly in Braz-
il but throughout the Portuguese Empire was the scarcity of white 
marriageable women. This condition was more acute and long-lasting in 
Brazil than in Spanish America.4 The need to populate and 'defend Braz-. 
il led some colonial officials to encourage miscegenation first with 
Amerindian women then with black slaves. Even as late as 1731 Minas 
Gerais, the area of gold production, had no European women of marriage-
able age. It is no wonder tha~ the· majority of the population of that 
province was mulatto or black.5 
Miscegenation in Brazil 
The circumstances in which the Portuguese discovered and colonized 
Brazil facilitated miscegenation and the rise of a substantial mulatto 
popultaion. The creators of the Portuguese Empire were adventurers, 
soldiers and traders. They were men alone, who had no family for whom 
they would sink roots into foreign soil. Portugal considered Brazil a 
penal colony, the depository of undesirables from Portugal. A substan-
tial number of these were sexual deviants and other heretics who had 
been convicted by the Inquisition.6 The Portuguese excluded women from 
the global expeditions sent to discover and settle new lands. The ini-
tial Portuguese colonist, the prisoner, the adventurer, the persecuted 
Jew or the run-away sailor, was single and unrestricted by such social 
considerations.as family or religion. The scarcity of white women, the 
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previous Portuguese experience with dark-skinned peoples and the darker 
somatic norm facilitated miscegenation with the Amerindian women found 
on the literal of Brazil.~ Freyre believes that most of the initial 
colonists were men from the southern part of Portugal, common men 
/ . (plebios) who perhaps carried a higher percentage of Moorish blood in 
their veins that their northern brothers. These men, called mozarabs, 
developed a somatic norm even darker that that of the northern Portu-
guese which came to Brazil later in the colonial period. / Sergio Buar-
que de Rolanda, a social historian of Brazil, agrees with Fr~re, de-
claring that " ••• the Portuguese, in great part, are, at the time of 
the discovery of Brazil, a people of mestieos ••• showing a big infusion 
of blood from Africa ••• 8 
The Amerindian woman, long black tresses hanging loose, bathed fre-
quently in forest streams. She compared favorably with the ideal of the 
Moorish woman, also a brown-skinned beauty who bathed frequently. The 
Amerindian woman encouraged the attentions of the Portuguese men, be-
lieving them to be gods. Freyre says that 
the ambience in which Brazilian life began was one of almost 
total sexual intoxication. The European found himself freed 
in lands overflowing with nude Indian women ••• These women 
were the first to surrender themselves to the whites ••• They 
gave themselves to the Europeans for a comb or a piece of 
mirror.9 
Miscegenation began years before the first formal colonizer, 
Martim Afonso de Sousa, received .his charter to settle the southern 
part of Brazil in 1530. The first Portuguese colonists found Nor-
mans, Bretons, Spanish and even English.living With the Tupiniquim, a 
trive of the southern Brazi~ian litoral. These early settlers began 
10 
the tradition of miscegenation which the Portuguese continued. The 
mesticos resulting from the white-Amerindian liasone were called mamelucos. 
Their ties to the white population helped attract native tribes to the Por-
tuguese side and provided fierce soldiers in the battles against the 
French, Dutch and Spanish. The memelucos appeared mainly in the North-
,. 
east, in the Sao Paulo area and in Rio Grande do Sul. That the impor-
tance o:f the mamelucos as fighters was great is revealed in the struggles 
against the French .from 1520 to 1615 when the Portuguese and mamelucos, 
with their Indian relatives• forged a m~litary defense against French 
aggression. The mamelucos played a vital role in the leadership of the 
Indian military forces because of their intermediary position between 
Indian and white. In the Dutch War from 1645 to 1654 this alliance be-
tween Portuguese and mameluco proved its strength.ll Freyre describes 
the Indians' contribution, stating that 
Indians and mamelucos formed. the living, moving wal which 
pushed the colonial Brazilian frontiers to the ;.vest at the 
same time that they defended, in the sugar-growing areas, 
the agrarian establishments against attacks of foreign 
pirates. Each sugar plantation in the 16th and 17th cen-
turies needed to maintain a standing a~ of tens and hun-
dreds of men ••• these men were almost all Indians or cabo-
clos (mamelucos) of the bow and arrm-1 and of extreme!Tii!i-
- . 12 tary bravery ••• 
The documentary and statistical evidence of the mestico popu ation 
in the 16th and 17th centuries is contradictory and scarce. Jo~o Pan-
dii'Calogeras, an eminent Brazilian historian, states that in 1583, 
25,000 whites, 14,000 black s~ave~, 18,000 civilized Indians and 800,000 
wild ones lived in Brazn.13 Euclides da Cunha, another Brazilian his• 
torian and the most celebrateq BrfiZi~ian author, states that in 1615 
Brazil had only 3,000 Portuguese colonists.14 Within the figures that 
Calogeras gives, therefore, must be the mamelucos who const1tuted a ma-
jority of the free population. Another source states that in 1650 Brazil 
35 
had 501 000 whites and 1001 000 others.15 In any case, until 1650 the mam-
elucos played a dominant role in the defense and exploration of Brazil and 
" ••• the Brazilian society ••• came to be founded largely upon families in 
16 
which Indian or part Indian women were the consorts or mothers •••• " 
After 1650 the rise of the second Brazilian mesti~o, the mulatto, the 
cross between black and white, overshadowed the influence of the marne-
luco. 
Misceg.ena tion with Africans 
The mulatto became an important segment of colonial Brazilian so• 
ciety. He early demonstrated discontent with the marginal status the 
Portuguese assigned him. This marginal status and subsequent attempts 
to change it politicized the colonial Brazilian military classes and 
thrAatened Portuguese control of Brazil. Helie Vianna, a Brazilian so-
cial historian, states that 
the importation of Africans, begun under the 5,1stem of 
donatarios ••• did not take long to make itself felt, by 
the copious miscegenation the results of which consti-
tute elements of the highe~t imrortance in the Braz-
ilian social formation ••• ll 
The Portuguese had begun the practice of black slavery before the 
discovery of Brazil. In 1441 Ant~o Gon~alves, a navigator-explorer em-
ployed by Henry the Navigator of the Sagres School, returned to Lisbon 
from an expedition in the Agrium Gulf with several hundred Moorish 
slaves. In 1444 the first Portuguese slave company, the Companhia de 
18 Lagos, began to explore Africa and capture black slaves. Systematic 
slave trade began in 1445 when Di~is Dias, another explorer, discovered 
Cape Verde. and the Senegal region, the first area inhabited by blacks 
the Portuguese had contacted. As adventures, crusades and the 
colonization of an expanding empire drained Portugal of agricultural 
' 19 laborers, Negro slaves began to till Portuguese soil. By 1550 Ne-
groes constituted 10% of Lisbon's population and black slaves performed 
a substantial part of the agricultural work. 20 The Portuguese coloni-
zers, therefore, were familiar with the practice of black slavery. 
The Portuguese control of both the African and American sides'of -
the Atlantic Ocean created propitious conditions for the introduction 
of~frican slaves into Brazil. Martim Afonso de Sousa's fleet, which 
arrived in Salvador in 1531, probably brought black slaves to Brazil 
and was perhaps engaging in the slave trade. 21 Pedro Calmon, an eminent 
Brazilian historian, believes, however, that the ~irst African slaves 
arrived in Pernambuco in 1546 at the request of Duarte Coelho, the owner 
of that capitania. Calmon reports that the first African slave arrived 
I -
in Bahia in 1551. In 1552 the captaincy of Sao Vicente in the south of 
Brazil near present-day Santos received 27 male and female slaves.22 
Slave. populations became concentrated in certain areas in colo-
nial Brazil--at first in the sugar-growing regions of Pernambuco, Ser-
gipe, Alagoas and Bahia and later in the gold-producing captaincies of 
Minas Gerais and Mato Grosso. 
Controversy clouds slave trade statistics. Ascertaining correct 
figures was complicated further in 1889 when Rqy Barbosa burned all the 
Brazilian slave ownership documents to prevent government reimburse-
ment to slave-holders after abolition. One of the most documented es-
timates is that of Roberto Simonsen, as Brazilian economist, who be-
lieves that 3,3001 000 black slaves entered Brazil during colonial times. 23 
Artur Ramos, a Brazilian sociologist, estimates that number to have been 
' : 'I 
rJ 24 :J,ooo,ooo. Renata Mendon~a, a Brazilian linguist and anthropologist, 
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believes that 5,000,000 Africans entered Brazil legally as slaves from 
1538 to 1830 while 210001 000 more entered as contraband.25 Another es-
timate claims that from 1550 to 1850 15 to 18 million slaves came to 
Brazil.26 The majority of these Africans were readily incorporated into 
the plantation system. They brought from Africa a familiarity with the 
agricultural tvay of life, the slAve tradition and sometimes even the 
slave status of their African cultures. 27 From the relationship between 
master and slave developed an illicit sexual liason between the Negress 
slaves and the.White senhores1 lords of the plantations, which lasted 
four centuries. Oliveira Vianna, early 20th centur,y Brazilian historian, 
describes the role of the plantation, stating that "putting in immediate 
and local contact the three races, the latifundio created a splendid nu-
cleus for the elaboration of the mestico.n28 The young sons of the senh-
or, enjoying a sexual licence on the plantation, impregnated young fe-
male slaves as soon as possible. These uhite fidalgos of the engenho 
proudly displayed their syphilitic sores much as soldiers display war 
wounds. 29 In this ambience the senzalas (slave quarters) and the roads 
of P.razil were soon filled with mulattoes. The senhor of the plantation 
often freed his lighter mulatto sons by the Negress slaves. These mu-
lattoes lolled on the roads and in the small villa.ges. They were, how-
ever, good soldiers and lov,ed military service.30 
Miscegenation between white and black, however, did not limit 
itself to the plantation. 'The free population of Brazil, those white 
plebian immigrants from Portugal who did not have the money or po;Lit:i,.cal 
influence to get land grants also mixed with the blacks. These free 
whites congregated on small lots located on the perimeter of the planta-
tion. ' . . 31 They usually became cow-herders, pig-herders and renters. This 
class mixed readily with the freed blacks, with the over-flow of the 
senzalas and with the mestit,os of the ranches. Vianna states that 
the white elements, localized on the marginal lands of the 
latifundia, sank into this absorvent riff-raff, which con-
stituted a few years later the majority of the free citi-
zens outside the latifundia system.32 
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Even priests contributed to the process of miscegen~tion in colonial 
Brazil, as Calmon has so ably reported. 
There are ecclesiastics, and not just_a few, who ••• live 
in great disorder with mulattoes and Negroes of whom, by 
their death, leave sons as heirs·of their goods and by 
these and other methods rna~ of the most valuable and 
superb properties of Brazil come into the hands of pre-
sumptuous mulattoes who in short time destroy the value 
of these properties.33 
It is difficult to ascertain the number of mulattoes in colonial 
Brazil for tw main reasons--the changing and complex social norms by 
which race was determined and the scarcity of reliable figures. From 
the colonial period to about 1870 Brazilians prefered to be called 
white, and those mulattoes who were associated with rich white families 
by marriage or blood were often termed white. At the fall of the Em-
pire in 1889 the mulatto was considered the principal Brazilian racial 
type and more people allowed themselves to be classified as mesticos. 
From 1890 to the present the myth of the 11Aryanization" or whitening of 
Brazilians ensured that light mulattoes were included within the white 
populations. The census of 1800 recorded that 84.2% of the population 
of Mato Grosso was non-white. The governor of that captaincy _appended 
to the 1780 census report the observation that " ••• three-fourths or even 
more of the referred total number of inhabitants are blacks, mulattoes or 
other mestiq,os of the many different kinds which exist in this cofurtry."34 
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Vianna gives some figures which demonstrate the fluctuation of racial 
classification in the census reports from 1835 to 1890. 
Year 
!835 
1872 
1890 
TABLE I35 
BRAZILIAN POPt1LAT ION FOR THE YEARS 
1835, 1872 and 1890 
. ACCORDING TO RACE·~ 
Whites Mesti!O& 84~,000 648, 0 
3,818,403 3,833,015 
6,302,198 4,638,495 
Blacks 
1,9B7;ooo 
3,970,~09 
2,097,426 
A table compiled by Dauril Alden, professor of history at the University 
of Washington, Seattle, and historian of the Lavradio period of colonial 
Brazil, illustrates more clearly the racial composition of colonial Braz-
il from 1772 to 1780. This table, Table II, is presented on page 40 of 
this stu<tr. The populations of Pernambuco and I3!hia1 two old sugar-pro-
ducing areas and regions of black and mulatto concentrations, are missing 
from the information.· Without a doubt, however, most of the population 
of Permanbuco and Bahi~ were slaves, both black and mulatto, from 1750 
to 18oo.36 The census of 1776 revealed that one-half of the population 
of Sao Paulo was white and one-half Tupi'(Indian). One-third of the pop-
ulation of Rio Grande do Sul was Negro slave while one-half of the popula-
tions of Minas Gerais was slave--one-fourth white and one-fourth pardo.37 
TABLE II 38 
RACIAL COMPOSITION OR CIVIL STATUS OF_THE POPULATION OF ElGHT CAPTAINCIES 1772-1780 
Place Whites % Pardos * % Blacks % Freemen % Slaves % Indians % 
Rio Negro 927 9.0 191 2.0 9,268 89.0 
,. 
Para 24,179 44.8 11,413 20.6 19,123 34.6 
Maranh~o 15,366 32.4 11,757 24.8 20,291 42.8 
Rio de 86,751 ~0.7 84,282 49.3 
Janiero 
Rio Grande 12,821 71.5 5,102 28.5 
de Sao 
Pedro 
Sao Paulo 65,974 56.4 22,459 19.2 28,542 24.4 
--Minas 76,664 24.0 76,110 23.8 166,995 52.2 
Gerais 
Mato 3,313 15.8 5,703 27.2 11,154 53.2 797 3.8 
Grosso 
*Pardo is a variation of the term mulatto. It literally means 11brownskinned." g 
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Thomas Skidmore, professor of history at the University of Wiscon-
sin, presents a graph that illuminates the racial picture of Brazil. 
It shows that before 1890 the mixed population was greater than the white 
and that the black population was the lowest of all three from 1872 to 
195'0. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate some 
statistically derived regressions using the Skidmore information, this 
writer has taken the liberty to augment Skidmore's graph with some ex-
trapolations. 
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Since Alden's information (See Table II, p. 40) indicates that a little 
less that one-half of colonial Brazilian population was black slave the 
extrapolation of the curve in Graph l representing the black population 
has been extended to approximately 40% in 1800. Conforming to Alden's 
estimates and other statistic,s presented above, the curves of the white 
and mixed blood populations have been extrapolated to 30% each,_ for the 
year 1800. C.R. Boxer, an eminent Engiish historian of Brazil, flatly 
states that in the last quarter of the 17th century; "the majority of 
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the population already consisted of mixed bloods." 
The writer, will therefore, attempt a broad generalization about 
the number of mulattoes in the colonial Brazilian population, utilizing 
the foregoing information. It appea.rs that by 1800 the mulatto consti-
tuted approximately 30% of colonial Brazil's population which was one-
half of the total of the free population. The whites comprised approx ... 
btately 30% of the total population while black slaves made up the re-
maining 40%. The areas where the mulatto appe~red in at least equal if 
not superior numbers to the whites-~as Gerais, Pernambuco and Bahia--
~-rere areas in which the Portuguese severely restricted his legal, social 
and economic participation in colonial life. These oppressed mulatto 
populations of Minas Gerais, Pernambuco and Bahia, consequently, produced 
military and civilian rebellions which gravely threatened Portuguese 
hegemony over Brazil. 
The Character of the Mulatto in Colonial Brazil 
In order to provide f~rther support for the hypothesis that areas 
of military rebellion represented areas of mulatto concentration it is 
necessary to clarify the char~cter of the mulatto and his military role 
in colonial ·Brazjlian society. During colonial times the mulatto found 
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himself in an anomalous situation. He was neither master nor siave, nor 
was he integrated into the latifundia system. He also encoWltered pre-
judice on the part of white Portuguese officials who barred his entry 
into any other organized sector of colonial Brazilian societ,y. The mu-
latto was thus an individual witho\}t a place in colonial Brazil and with-
out a future under Portuguese rule. He, therefore, represented a source 
of discontent and rebelliousness in the colony. 
In colonial Brazil the only organized and productive sector of the 
society was the slave sector, the large land unit called the engenho 
that provided the geographical nucleus for the organization necessary 
for sugar production. The engenho effectively organized the means of 
production--labor, land and capital--to provide an exportable product. 
The engenho, therefore, became the most important economic element in 
the 16th and 17th centuries because it provided regular and substantial 
taxes for the royal treasury and a financial base for the colonial aris-
tocracy. Within the confines of the engenho lived the three social 
classes of colonial Brazil--the white land-owning senhor and his family 
who lived in the casa grande; the slaves who lived in the senzalas; and 
a mixed and white free population who congregated in and around the en-
genho as squatters, hangers-on and mercenaries. The white land-owner 
controlled the system in which he allocated a place for the black ae the 
laboring element and the Indian as idealized by the Catholic Church. 
Outside this realm chaos reigned.4l 
The dominance of the slave sector stunted the development of the 
middle class--the artisans and the professional classes--because slaves 
performed most of the needed services. Certain slaves received train-
ing as cobblers, metal workers, leather workers, cooks, tailors, carpen-
ters and even teachers. Many owners, especially in the 18th centur,y 
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when the towns began to grow more populous and important, hired out 
their skilled slaves (escra•os ~ ganho) and expropriated the wages the 
slaves earned. This practice .of labor exploitation helped precipitate 
the Bahian uprising of 1798. As can be readily understood, such prac-
tices prevented the appearance of a substantial, significa.nt group of 
free artisans ana skilled workers.42 . The p~edominance of the latifundia 
also prevented the formation of a peasant proprietor class.43 
The mulatto found no outlet in commercial activity or in the bu-
reaucracy. The Portuguese Crown maintained a monopoly on all external 
and internal trading of the colony. The Portuguese Crown often sold 
this monopoly to companies, usually owned by New Christians (recently 
converted Jews who kept their beliefs and practices intact secretly.)44 
The extended Brazilian family controlled bureaucratic, political and re-
ligious sectors of the colony. The mulatto, in most instances born out-
side the bonds of matrimony, did not, therefore, enjoy access to aqy po-
sitions in politics, the ·bureaucracy or the Church.45 Magnus M~rner, 
·a historian of Latin American, quotes Sergio Bagu, comparative historian 
of Spanish and Portuguese American, who declares that 
••• the mestizo of the CQlanial period ••• was not allocated 
any place witl!in the economic structjlre'and also lacked 
an allocation in the social structure because, not being 
Negro or Indian he tried to be white without success. Co-
lonial society placed him between two fires, creating 
resentment in him1 In addition, he received neither work 
nor education ••• 4b 
The anomalie, disorganization and scarcity of opportunity outside 
the dominant master-slave matrix c~nd~mned a substantial portion of the 
', ' 
population to vagrancy, unemployment and marginality. As early as the 
16th century vagrancy caused probl~ms. The vagrants (vadios) were 
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comprised mainly of mulattoes and other mesticos. The mulattoes~ living 
by begging, performing odd jobs and providing mercenary military service, 
filled the roads of the countryside and the dirt streets of the small 
villages. C.R. Boxer blames the Portuguese policy for this situation, 
declaring that. 11 the laws forbidding the employment of mulattoes in govern-
ment positions ~-tere, of course, la.regely responsible for the perennial 
problem of unemployed or underemployed half-breeds ..... 48 
The dominance of the master-slave sector, the scarcity of opportunity 
outside the sector and the Crown's official policy regarding government 
employment of mulattoes, therefore, doomed the mulatto to marginal sta-
·tus. 
In 1937 America12. sociologist Everett Stonequist developed the con-
cept of marginality. Marginal men are not necessarily those of a lower 
socio-economic class, such as the slaves in colonial Brazil. Marginality 
occurs when a relatively free class parta'<:es of the culture and aspir-
ations of the dominant class of the society but does not dispose of the 
means to attain acceptance within that class. The individual >-rho most 
' ' intimately embibes the dominant group's norms and culture becomes a 
marginal person when rejection occurs. The use of race as the criterion 
for rejection of the individual drives him into an even more marginal 
situation because he cannot control or modify rejection by any personal 
quality or achievement. He cannot control his birth or ancestry·. In 
reaction to the feelings of inferiority the dominant group's rejection 
c!"elltes in him, the marginal person may develop, in co11pensation1 an ex-
ternal attitude of superiority and, because of his unsatisfactory posi-
tion in society, may become a provocative and dangerous critic of the 
dominant group and its culture.49 Donald Pierson characterizes the 
colonial Brazilian mulatto as marginal by explaining that 
••• the rise [Or the mulatt_£7 was accompanied by the 
personal stresses and strains which an individual in 
the process of moving from one class to another or-
dinarily experiences. The first mulattoes to pene-
trate the upper tiers reflected in their personal 
lives participation in two different and to some ex-
tent antagonistic worlds which.metand fused,· so to 
speak, in their own personalities. They were ••• 
marginal men.~O 
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The character of the mulatto reflected his marginal position in co-
lonial Brazil. The mulattoes " ••• were the proudest and most restless 
group in the whole country, presumptuous, violent, libertarian ••• 
rebellious of all subjection, arrogant in their liberty."Sl The mu-
lattoes were reputedly more aggressive, cunning and intelligent than the 
black. Freyre believes that the mulatto may have even surpassed the 
white in capacities of leadershir and adaptation to the Brazilian milieu.S2 
The white senhores described the mulatto's mind as incoherent, uneven, tur-
bulent, dissolvent, restless and unstable, although brilliant at times. 
Sensitive and unreconciled to their low status and prestige, the mulattoes 
exhibited a rebellious attitude in colonial Brazil. In Bahia the insolence 
became more noticeable after 1750; in 1803 the first line troop commander 
there cursed the troops of pardos (darker-skinned mulattoes) as the most 
rebellious and elisorderly in Brazil. 
Although colonial Brazilian 111hites sometimes acknowledged the in-
telligence of the mulatto, they resented the aggressiveness he developed 
in the struggle to ascend socially and professionally. Adjectives used 
by Pern~mbucan whites to describe mulAttoes include forward, envious, 
je8lous, disrespectful, pretentious, unconstant, unreliable, arrogant, 
boastful, cocksure and cheeky.53 To separate himself as much as possible 
from the stignatized source of his racial heritage--the black--the 
47 
mulatto copied the ideas, clothes, manners and education of the white as 
much as possible.54 The latifundia system, however, incorporated few of 
the mulattoes into the plantation organization. Those few, chosen on the 
basis of character, conduct and principally on color, enjoyed acceptance 
into the white society by gaining land or by marrying into a senhorial 
family. The rest of the mesticos, those easily recognized as having Af-
rican blood, the stigmatized ones, the ~~ (cross of mulatto and 
black), the pardos, the fulos (sallow blacks), the cafusos (cross of 
Indian and black), found the doors of the white society closed against 
them.55 
The mulatto, however, by attrition, began to attend schools. The 
education of.a small mulatto group by the lSth century made that colored 
elite acutely sensitive to prejudicial attitudes and actions. The edu-
cated mulattoes or those who pretended to enter the intelligentsia class 
(such as Tiradentes who will be discussed later) became doubly sensitive 
and frustrated. Ability, education and intelligence did not provide the 
mulatto with the adequate and effective means to rise socially and ec-
onomically as long as Portuguese imperial officials refused to promote 
mulattoes on solely racial grounds. The Portuguese refusal sprang from 
two sources--color prejudice and nationality prejudice. Not only were 
the rr1ulattoes men of color but they were natives, Brazilians who threat-
ened continued Portuguese rule.56 
The sensitive marginal man elsewhere in the past often adjusted to 
the contradictory position in which he found himself by identifying with 
the subordinate or oppressed group, assuming leadership of that group 
and uniting it by appeals to nationalism. The marginal individual ac-
quired prestige and self-respect in the new position he created. 57 
This process occurred in colonial Brazil. Nationalism became a refuge 
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for the mulatto, providing the vehicle with which to. escape :his marginal 
condition withing white Portuguese hegemo~. 
Colonial Brazilian society permanently alienated and rejected the 
mulatto. The white classe~ rejected him just as he had rejected the 
slave classes. He lived in a perpetually unstable social situation un-
der constant contradictory pressures. The sensitive and self-conscious 
mulatto felt humiliated and wounded by his social stigmatization and his 
irritability and sensitivity grew into enmity and rancor. His arrogance, 
aggressiveness and insolence bred sarcasm, turbulence and rebellion. His 
nationality and color invited the prejudice of Portuguese imperial offi-
cials; he therefore espoused nationalism as social, economic and psycho-
logical salvation. 
Authorities disagree about the existence and extent of Portuguese 
prejudice based on race and color. Pierson states that in colonial 
Brazil marriage into upper class white families was zealously restricted 
to individuals of European descent.58 Tiradentes, the hero of the ln-
t ·---confid~ncia Mineira, wanted to marry a White girl of Sao Joao del Rei in 
Minas Gerais. Her father refused to give permission, however, because 
Tiradentes was a mulatto.59 
' 
The mil:i.tary organization of the coloey reflected racial and color 
attitudes. There were battalions for whites, others for men of color 
and still others for blacks.60 The policies of the first and second 
lines reflected racial considerations. Boxer writes that 
••• soldiers of the regular garrisons in Brazil served alongside 
each other without distinction of color, though the European-born 
were apt to be favored when it came to a question of promotion or 
one of compassionate discharge. The militia regiments, on the 
other hand, were organized on a class and color basis ••• the free 
Negro, however, and the dark-hued mulatto had little or no hope 
of ascending, whatever their aptitudes or qualifications.61 
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Only European whites advanced beyond second lieutenant, and the.y were 
promoted only if they were married to white women. The Marquis de 
Lavr;dio, Vice-Roy of Brazil from 1768 to 1777, did not allow colored 
militia officers to attend his forrna.l receptions. He merely allowed 
them to bow to him from the doorway and then required that they re-
turn to their homes. The same Lavradio dismissed an Indian military 
officer for marrying a Negro woman and thus blemishing his blood by 
this alliance.62 
Whenever possible white Portuguese received the highest military 
and government posts while mestit_os suffered second-rate status.63 
Mulattoes and men of any color, including whites married to mulattoes, 
could not hold any public offices.64 The wording of colonial legis-
lation classed the free mulatto with the Negro slave. Law forbade 
both to carry weapons, wear expensive clothing or use any other mark 
which might equate them with whites. I~ 1731 the governor of Pernam-
buco refused '00 allow a qualified mulatto lawyer to practice as the 
King 1 s attorney-general (Procurador) because of color.65 Separate 
courts of j~tice processed those pardos or mulattoes who transgressed 
' colonial law. In addition, these groups received stricter and more 
sever punishment than whites.66 Even the religious schools rejected the 
mulattoes. In 1680 the mulattoes of Bahia protested to the Crown in 
Lisbon and to the Jesuit General in Rome that the Jesuit schools in Sal-
va.dor excluded them. Padre Antbnio Vieira, hed Jesuit school-master in 
Ba.hia, said that the upper class whites would not tolerated pardos of 
"vile and obscure origin" to sit beside their sons. 67 
The white Portuguese male did IIB.te freelywith blacks and mulattoes. 
But this propensity to sexual license, however, did not produce a toler-
ant racial attitude. A conscious attitude of white superiority prevailed 
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in colonial times. The white upper classes of colonial Brazil inherited 
this attitude, which was further compounded by the low status of blacks 
in Brazil. The men of color were slaves, a conquered and controlled 
people. The toleration therefore extended to blacks and mulattoes in 
personal relations became blunted and distorted into a hypocritical 
official policy by much legal and social discrimination. Caio Prado, 
Jr., an eminent Brazilian historian, states that this official prejud-
ice against any dark-skinned person, the result of the degraded position 
of the black slave and the native, excluded him from the good things of 
life in colonial Brazil. He continues that the political role of this 
racial antagonism, not yet fully estimated, was considerable.68 B,y 1847, 
twenty-five years after Brazil won independence from Portugal, the situ-
ation had so changed that a French visitor observed that 
in Brazil, in all social classes, among judges, and even among 
doctors, among those who direct the politics of the country as 
well as among the men of letters, one notices mulattoes of a 
talent, a spirit, of a wisdom and os such instruction that give 
them much im·~ortance and ascendancy •• • 69 
The Military Role of the Mulatto in Colonial Brazil 
The function and character of the colonial Brazilian soldier helped 
determine those of his heir, the soldier of the Brazilian Empire and 
' 
Republic, Who played such important political roles from 1822 to 1898. 
A description of this soldier woul~ h~lp us understand the importance 
of his colonial antecedent. The hero of 1889i the army officer, was 
the type of sly and suspicious caboclo, celebrated for his 
rustic, almost hick (amatutado) way of dressing and for his 
hayseed habit of kicking off his military boots and resting 
his big feet (a sign of African heri~age) in slippers; it 
was he Who incarnated the nAw political order established by 
bachareis (university graduates) and doutores (literally 
doctors, but refering to men of letters and advanced studies), 
united to the majors and captains, there being not a few 
hybrids in this revolutionary group, not only of blood 
but of vocation: the captain-doutores1 the majors-dou-
tores, the colonels-doutores. The military-bachareis.70 
The dominance of the mulatto in the Imperial and later in the 
Republican Brazilian army did not obtain without a slow process of 
development. Its roots lie in the beginning of the colonial period. 
51 
The mameluco and later the mulatto did find a makeshift method of in-
tegration to the master-slave structure of colonial Brazil, although 
the Portuguese and white Brazilians restricted him in the process. 
The agrarian sugar plantations and to a lesser extent the cattle ranches 
faced two fierce and determined enemies in colonial times--Indians and 
foreign pirates. The great agricultural institutions, therefore, es-
tablished military forces for defense. They became as much military in-
stitutions as economic and social units. Each senhor maintained a mer-
cenary force to defend his eneenho. Usually these forces had ties other 
that employment with the land-owning family, especially during the 16th 
and 17th centuries. Sometimes they were sons or grandsons of the senhor 
or enjoyed another degree of kin. These forces made up the warrior clans 
of the engenho.71 The very vagrancy of the mulatto freed him from labor 
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but made him liable for military service. Vianna states that 
••• the mestico in colonial society was a nomad ••• uprooted, 
dislocated, unfixed ••• his nomadism of hunting and wandering 
transformed easily into a military nomadism ••• in the gangs 
of the caudilhos or iri the bandeiras ••• the rural senhor had 
every reason in keeping the mulatto-so nomadic7~nd unemployed, for he was the one who defended the country ••• 
The mass of idle and unemrloyed mulattoes became the combative 
forces of the colony. The mulatto vagrant of the small villages, of 
the senzalas and of the roads became a soldier. Given the 
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disorganization and feudal structure of 16th and 17th centuries, the 
mulatto combatant appeared in the employ of the rural senhor to whom he 
often had blood. After 1650, the first and second lines increased nu-
merically and service in the second line provided the perennially unem-
ployed and vagrant mulattoes an outlet for their "superabundant energy."?3 
The first line invariably included Portuguese regiments. The scarcity 
of Portuguese man-power, however, ensured that Brazilians would enter 
the ranks of the first line on a large scale. Theoretically only whites 
entered the first line, but in Brazil, with the mixed population being 
so numerous, this rule proved unenforceable. Blacks and dark-skinned 
mulattoes, however, found themselves excluded; the specific instructions 
for first-line enlistment allowed entrance of mulattoes "when color is 
not too dusky."74 
The military sector, although at first not separate from the ex-
port or slave sector, did provide an alternative source of social in-
tegration, albeit a weak and unsatisfactory one. Military life attrac-
ted the mulatto for several reasons. Portuguese officials forbade free 
Negroes, mulattoes and Amerindian half-breeds to carry lethal weapons. 
Enlistment in the first or second lines, however, cancelled the re;.. 
striction even though colonial authorities continued to regard "the 
proletarian members of this class with dislike and suspicion.n75 The 
a~ uniform increased the prestige of mulattoes; it whitened or Ary-
anized them to a certain degree and made them more acce~table to the 
colonial aristocrats.76 The few mulattoes ~o, in colonial times, came 
to exercise certain military or civil authority became officially white 
because it was theoretically impossible for a man of color to hold posts 
usually reserved for whites. An English 1fiSitor as la~e as 1837 asked 
if the capitao-mor of Pernambuco were mulatto. The visitor's informant 
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was reluctant to adinit that such·an·elevated Brazilian Imperial military 
officer were mulatto, although in reality he was. The poor informant 
resolved his dile~~ by merely rolling his eyes and asking the visitor 
rhetorically it it were possible for a capi~o-mor to be mulatto.77 
It is difficult to quantify the data presented above. The writer 
has been unable to find statistics on the number of racial composition 
of colonial Brazilian troops. The information perhaps does exist in the 
archives of state and local governments in Brazil or perhaps in the Por-
tuguese colonial archies. Unfortunately the writer had no opportunity 
to do extended research on the ethnic composition of the colonial Braz-
ilian military classes. The Portuguese imperial charters, however, 
organized colonial Brazil militarily. Every free male citizen enlisted 
in one of the three lines. Since by at least 1750 the mulatto population 
constituted about one-half of the free population, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that at least one-half of thos~ enlisted in the military clas-
ses were mulatto. It further appears reasonable to assume that mulattoes, 
given their vagrancy and alienation from the plantation system, consti-
tuted more than one-half of the first and second lines. Since colonial 
authorities did not promote muiattoes beyond the post of second lieu-
tenant in the first line, those competent mulattoes, whose other alter-
natives for employment and subsequent social and economic ascendancy 
were restricted, probably constitu~ed a discontented and dangerous lot. 
The military structures of colonial Brazil--th~ first and second 
· lines--united these mulattoes in an organization that met frequently 
and that could be readily used for purpos~s qther than defense of the 
nation such as political rebelliOn. The mulattoes, therefore, 'ilith 
their ~llies of 18th centr~ Brazil, the ~isaffected middle groups, 
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disposed of an advantageous organization, a military one, to implement 
certain civilian and military objectives. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ERA OF INCIPIENT NATIONALISM 1624-1711 
The Dutch Expulsion 1648-16.54 
In 1.580 the Spanish King; Phillip II (1556-98), incorporated Portu-
gal into his kingdoms. Portugal and her colonies inherited from the 
Spanish a host of enemies, including the determined Dutch. In 1581 
Holland and Zealand, at this time called the Spanish Netherlands, ini-
tiated a struggle against Spain to gain their religious and economic 
freedom. The fight continued for seventy years. In 1621 Holland's 
States-General, following the English example, chartered the first 
Dutch commercial company, the Dutch \t/est Indies Company to establish 
trading centers and colonies for Holland. To harrass Spain, t6 cap-
ture a rich sugar-producing area and to combat the commercial mono;-oly 
Phillip II imposed on Brazil the Dutch, i.n 1624, attacked Salvador,Ba-
hia, the c?pital of colonial Brazil. The Portuguese, however, with the 
help of Indians, defeated them. In 1630 the Dutch '·Jest Indies Compamy 
a.gain invaded Brazil under the command of John :r-raurice Nassau, a brilliant 
. soldier and enlightened administrator \'rho had introduced new methods 
into the Dutch military organization. This time the Dutch chose to in-
vade Recife, the center of the. capitania of Pernambuco, becau~e it was 
more vulnerable than Salvador and because it was the export center of the 
rich sugar-producing area of Pernambuco. , By 1635 all tPe Portuguese cen-
ters of resistance had fallen to the invading Dutch, who had hired many 
61 
Brazilians and Indians a.s mercenaries.1 
The Brazilians liked Nassau. He reinvested the profit which the 
Dutch lrJest Indies Company reaiized in Pernambuco to improve the region 
Hith roads, gardens, schools and other urban improvement schemes. He 
reduced taxes and provided liberal credit to sugar planters to rebuild 
their piantations after the struggle. He created municipal and rural 
councils composed of the planters from Pernambuco and Paraiba to combat 
the corruption that was rife among the middle government officials. 2 
A number of Jews accompa.nied the Dutch in their occupation of Re-
cife. During the Middle Ages the Jews had gained control of much cap-
ital through their money-lending and trading activities. JeV~."ish popu-
lations throughout West Europe disposed of a great amant of liquid 
capital that they loaned to kins and also which they invested in the 
newly forming commercial companies. The Dutch ~'Jest Indies Company had 
been no exception and the Jews, in return for liquid capital investment, 
received the right to monopoli~e the food trade in Recife. The Company 
also farmed out its tax-gathering responsibilities to the Jews, ~ho in 
turn delegated the chore to those Brazilians disposing of the necessary 
military forces. l1any Brazilians who had been poor before the Dutch 
came made fortunes by cooperating with their conquerors. These newly 
rich men with semi-co!Tll"1ercial functions such as tax-collecting, con-
stituted a new middle group which disposed of miB tary forces. It is 
this group that in 1645 would begin the struggle against the Dutch. 
The process by which the Dutch levied taxes invited much procras-
tination. The Company, always short of cash and planning ventures in 
Asia, disapproved of Nassau• s len~_ent credit and tax policies. In 1643, 
against Nassau's advice, the Company's board of governors called in all 
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the debts of the Brazilian tax-gatherers am planters who had, in the 
past eight years, made heavy investments in neH slaves and improvements 
by borrowing money from the Jewish creditors of the Company in Recife. 
The Company probably judged the political and economic situation correct-
. ly. In 1640 Portugal had freea herself from Spain and planned to make 
an alliance with England and Holland against her former master. This 
alliance with free Brazil from Dutch rule. 
Ant~nio Telles da Silva, governor-general in Bahia, sent Andre' 
Vidal de Negreiros, the Brazilian commander of the royal troops in 
Bahia, to Pernambuco and Paraiba to confer with the Portuguese planters 
indebted' to the merchants of the Dutch company. Vidal, an ambitious 
man, knew that if he helped to free Pernambuco from the Dutch, the 
grateful Bahian governor would reward him. Indeed, in 1654 da Silva 
rJ 
appointed him Governor of Maranhao, part of the area the Dutch had con-
trolled. 
In Paraiba during August and September Vidal contacted the leading 
,. 
planters and ranchers, among whom was Jose Fernandes Vieira, eulogized 
by many Brazilian historians as the creator of Brazilian nationalism. 
Vieira, a member of the n~-rich class, had profited by coorerating 
witn the Dutch. He was a mulatto, the son of a mulatta prostitute in 
Madeira, a Portuguese island in the Atlantic.3 The older planters called 
him an ambitious mulatto ( 11 arnbicioso mulato") and criticized him for his 
methods of economic and social advancement.4 
In 1638 Vieira had obtained a tax-farming contract and by 1641 had 
so prospered that he owned sixteen sugar plantations and two huge cattle 
ranched in Paraiba. He also, however, owed the second biggest debt in 
the 9apitania· of Pernambuco to the Dutch in R~cife. In 1641 his request 
for a reduction in his account had been refused. He owed a total of 
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38,000 florins.5 The Company, in the meantime, had recalled Nassau from 
his post in Recife for insubordination. Nassau had refused to implement 
the orders he had received in 1643 from the Company's board of governors 
to foreclose on the tax-gatherers and planters. The Company also feared 
that Nassau would attempt to establish a personal domain in Brazil. His 
successor immediately executed the order to collect all back taxes and 
loans. The financial pressure put on the indebted planters drove them 
to join Vie:i.ra in planni.ng a rebellion against the Dutch although many 
of the old rlanters hated him.6 A contemporary report observes that 
"the Portuguese in this country because they are so deeply indebted, 
indeed most of them much more than they can hope to pay in their life-
time ••• scheme night and day to revolt ••• "7 
On June 13, 1945, after much consultation among the big plantations' 
owners and the rancers of Paratba and Pernambuco, Vieira led a revolt 
against the Dutch. Only about 150 men, mostly mulattoes and African 
slaves to whom he had promised freedom, joined him in his refuge in the 
Fernambucan interior. 8 On August 3, 1645, he and his motley troops won 
the hard-fought Battle of Tabocas outside of Recife in the Pernambucan 
agreste. A few days later Henrique Dias, a free black leader of a bat-
talion of black mercenaries, and Felipe Camarao, the leader of a batta-
lion of Indian mercenaries, joined Vieira. On August 16, 1645, Vidal, 
commanding a royal regiment from Bahia, and Martim Soares Moreno, an 
old Indian fighter and commander of another first line regiment from 
Bahia, increased the number of rebellious troops. The majority of the 
Portuguese and Brazilian planters, however, refused to join the struggle, 
prefering to procrastinate until they were su..re Vieira would succeed. 
The revolt was not a popular uprising. Vieira had been able to 
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hire a small mercenary force of mulattoes, win an initial battle and 
attract the larger professional black and Indian mercenary troops under 
rJ 
Henrique Dias and Felipe Camarao. The governor-general of Bahia, under 
orders from the Portuguese Crown, also aided Vieira by releasing first 
line troops under Vidal and Moreno. The older, more established planters 
such as Sebastigo Carvalho and Jorge Homem Pinto 1<1I'ote to the Bishop of 
...., 
Bahia on July B, 1645, protesting the arrival of Dias and Camarao to help 
Vieira. In 1646 other planters and colonists of Pernambuco requested 
that da Silva remove Vieira from command. They accused Vieira of start-
ing the rebellion solely on account of his great indebtedness to the 
Dutch and alleged that he and his cronies, the senior officers of the 
first lines from Bahia, were amassing fortunes from the war. They char-
ged that Vieira ha4 levied forced taxes on the colonists for prosecu-
tion of the war and had kept the slaves, oxen and other booty taken from 
the Dutch. He was, the citizens accused, " ••• waging the war with the 
blood of the poor •••• •10 N Joao IV told da Silva to file the planters' 
letter where nob~ could see it. 
The Brazilians proved to be fierce fighters. Michiel van Goch Who 
witnessed the second battle of ~uararapes on February 19, 1649, declared 
tha.t "the enemy's men ••• are ••• formidable from ~heir natural ferocity, 
consisting as they do of Brazilians, Tapuyas, Negroes, mamelucos and ••• 
. nll 
also Port~guese and Ital1ans.... . The leaders and troops who waged 
the Dutch war were the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Antbnio Dias Cardosa--sent to Vieira with forty men by the 
~ Bahian governor-general 
Felipe Camarao--leader of ?etiguan Indian mercenary regiment 
Martim Soares Moreno--first line commander from Bahia; his re-
giment dispersed among the others when he re-
turned to Bahia in 164 7 
Henrique Dias--leader of a regiment of free black and mulatto 
mercenaries 
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5. Francisco Barreto--field marshal with 3,000 volunteers from 
Bahia (probably second liners from the mili-
tia and probably mostly mulattoes 
6. Jos~Fernandes Vieira--joint commander of the rebellion and 
leader of mostly mulatto troops recruited 
locally in Pernambuco 
7. Andre Vidal de Negreiros--joint commander of the rebellion and 
commander of a regiment of Portuguese in-
fantry from Bahia. 
The Brazilians fought the Dutch for nine years after Nassau returned 
to Europe. In l6l19 they won the second battle of Guararapes, killing 
the Dutch commander Van den Bruncke and capturing maQY prisoners and 
weapons. Preoccupied with a war against the English, Holland aban-
doned her soldiers in Brazil. In 1654 the weakened Dutch garrison of 
Recife capitulat8d and boarded the Taborda for Europe. The victory, 
more ~pparent that real, was a Brazilian triumph, however, because a 
feeling of Brazilian nationalism began to grow there in the Northeast. 
Holland, however, maintained her supremacy in the ':.Test Indies and the 
Atlantic and received restitution for her improvements in Recife in 1661 
by the Treaty of the Hague with Portugal. The Dutch also retained the 
privilege to trade with Brazil. 
The first outlines of the alignment of the colonial military classes 
appear in the Dutch war. Vieira represented two elements which played 
important roles later in the struggle against Portuguese dominance of 
Brazil and which employed the military classes in their political struggle. 
He belonged to a new middle group, one with semi-commercial functions, 
created by the Dutch bureaucracy. His success, resented by the old 
.guard which expressed disapproval of his tactics and position, and his 
methods of switching sides and availing himself of every opportunity to 
ascend, indica'ted the instability of his position. He was a mulatto_. 
one of the group whose increasing restlessness later so threatened the 
hegemony of white Portuguese and Brazilian rule. He also attracted lo-
c'"l mP.rcenary forces, later joined by Dias and Cam~o whose profession-
al black and Indian mercenaries v.rere paid with capture~ Dutch booty. 
The _Emboaba Affair 
In the fifty ye8rs that followed the Dutch expulsion Brazil grew 
and changed, pushing her frontiers to the North, South and 'dest. The 
discovery of gold in Minas Gerais, which at that time was considered 
the hinterland of the capitania of Rio de Janeiro, initiated a process 
by which the focus of colonial life moved from the sugar-producing 
N:ortheast and its c.:Jpital of Salvador to the gold-mining southern re-
gions of Hinas Gerais and sa'o Paulo. 
The 2aulist~~ those intrepid adventurers of Sao Paulo, many of 
them mamelucos, had always enjoyed renown for their restlessness and 
adventurous expeditions (?.~~~~~~~) into the interior of Brazil. In-
di.an tales of fabulous riches in the interior fascinated the paulia"' 
t~s and lured them farther and farther into the ~~~t~o (hinterland) to . 
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the north and west of Sao Paulo. They suffered incredible hardships 
and privations in their search for gold and Indian slaves. They did 
not suffer in vain. In 1698 an old paulista, Manuel Borba Gate, dis-
covered gold in a stream near present-day Ouro Freto, Minas Gerais. 
Estimates of the· value of the gold that left t1inas Gerais legally and 
illegally during the 18th century vary, but all agree that it rivalled 
the American production from California. 
The Portuguese attitude toward the acquisition of wealth, so dia-
metrically opposed to the Anglo-Saxon tradition,governed the exploita-
tion of the Brazilian gold mines. During the Reconquest the 
'Portuguese developed the idea that conquest and exploitation of others' 
labor constituted a legitimate method of acquiring wealth. The Portu-
guese ~~go (noble) did not have to be productive economically. He 
was intrinsically valuable and did not have to prove his worth by pro-
ducing anything. Indeed, if he did produce economically then his sta-
tus and prestige diminished because he v.muld be measured by the product 
of his being, not by his being or entity alone. He prefered the condi-
tion in which he received wealth from land or conquest and spent it on 
imported goods. He favored quick, short-term ventures, preferably mili-
t:~ry conquest, that brought immediate return in the form of disposable 
we~lth. Gold-mining, a venture based on slave labor and one that brought 
quick wealth, appealed to the Portuguese of the early 18th century. In 
the par~icular case of Minas Gerais conquest involved defeating only a 
handful of paulistas, expropriating their goid-panning sites and bring-
ing in slaves to mine the gold. 
The p~ulistas tried to keep their gold discoveries a secret, but 
by 1702 rumors had reached Portugal of the fabulous gold finds in I1inas 
Gerais. About 81 000 Portuguese settlers called f~~asteiros who lived 
on the Brazilian coast, infiltrated the Minas Gerais sert~o. Another 
801 000 adventurers from Portugal, called ~inos, followed. 13 These 
for~steiros and reinos, forming a new middle group between the old 
paulistas and the royal officials, had commercial functions and disposed 
of enough liquid capital to not oply exploit the mines more fully than 
the paulistas but also to hire mercenaries to carry out the conquest of 
the gold fields. Gustavo Barroso, a Brazilian military historian, states 
that 
••• emboabas, enriched by commercial activities, possessed the 
superior capacity to -cooperate among -each. other and with 
their money were able to buy more slaves for work in the 
mines and to pay the mercenaries of mamelucos and Indians ••• l4 
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The paulistas called the invaders emboabas because they wore fringed 
boots which reminded the paulistas of the feather ... covered le·gs of a 
~ . 
type of sertao bird called the emboaba. The paulistas panned the streams 
for gold with no shoes while the emboabas mainly worked the mines with 
boots protecting their feet. 
At first the emboabas and paulistas cooperated to elude the royal 
tax-gatherers who attempted to tax the gold production of Minas Gerais. 
Conflict between the two former·. groups, however, soon erupted for two 
reasons. The emboabas either already possessed slaves or had the money 
to buy them in large numbers for profitable work in the mines. They 
soon o~tstripped the slaveless paulistas in production and exploration 
for new mines. The paulistas ~omplained bitterly to the Crown, which, 
although it did no favor the movement of slaves from the coastal areas 
into Minas Gerais because sugar production ~ropped, could not prevent 
the clandestine slave smuggling. 
The emboabas, many of them of New Christian origin, managed to ne-
gotiate contracts with the royal officials concerning the supply of beef 
~nd other foodstuffs for MinAs Gerais. Food production in Minas Gerais 
. fe~l dramatically after the gold discoveries because the mines drained 
men from agriculture. Fod had to be imported and a certain group of em-
boabas obtained a food supply monopoly and charged exorbitant prices. 
In 1708 paulista resentment against the emboabas exploded into o-
vert action. Manuel Borba Gato demanded that the emboabas' ·eleated lea-
dar, Manuel Nunes Vianna, leave Minas Gerais and return to his cattle 
ranc~es on the Sgo Francisco River in Bahia. Vianna refused to leave, 
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declaring that he was keeping the King's peace in Minas Gerais.15 
Gathering a mercenary army of 31000 men Vianna declared himself Regent 
and Governor of the Mines and moved to expel the paulistas. On Decem-
bar 20,. 17081 Bento do Amaral, Vianna 1 s executive officer, trapped a 
paulista force at Rio das Hortes. The paulistas surrendered· their a.rms 
after accepting Amaral's promise of leniency. After receiving the arms, 
howeyer, Amaral and his emboaba mercenaries " ••• ran over the paulistas 
16 
and killed them all in a most cowardly manner ••• " 
A citizen junta (open meeting) met in Rio de Janeiro and demanded 
that Governor-General Fernando Martins Mascarenhas de Lencastro go to 
Minas Gerais to restore order, even though a royal letter of January 31, 
17021 had forbade governors of Rio to enter Minas.17 Lencastro, taking 
only 14 soldiers with him, journs.veQ to Minas Gerais. Vianna, in the 
meantime, had increased his army of mercenaries to 41 000. Quickly re-
cognizi.ng the futility of his mission, Lencastro .returned to Rio. 
Vianna' s potver over Minas Gerais was broken only in 1710' when the first 
governor-general of the newly-fortned capitania of Minas Gerais, Antbnio 
rle Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho, arrived with authorization to raise 
a large army to combat any other foroe. 
The emboabas had controlled the commercial life of Minas Gerais, in-
eluding the vital food-stuffs trade. Lencastro had ceded the meat trade 
monopoly to Francisco do Amaral Gurgel, a large cattle rancher, who 
gouged the paulistas with exorbitant prices for beef. Vianna and Gurgel 
were partners, and 
••• Vianna pa.rticipated in the odious meat monopoly, which 
generated rivers of money for him. This monopoloy of 
meat trades, as those who know how commerce worked in 
those times understand, was the property of the Jews ••• l8 
10 
The paulistas indeed had cause to cemplain. Vianna sold one beef car-
/ 
cass for 70 to 90 mil-reis in the towns of Minas Gerais while the mar-
ket, price elsewhere was 3 to 9 oi tavos de ouro (about 10 mi~-re'is). l9 
Not only did Gurgel control the meat trade, but he also held the mono-
poly for tobacco and hrandy.2° 
The emboabas effectively controlled the military classes of the 
mining areas. Vianna has hired his own milit~ry forces. The execu-
tive officer tvas Ant'Snio da Silv~, an adventurer of the first line who 
led the mercenary force of mamelucos and Indians.21 The armed slaves 
til 
of Pascoal da Silva Guimaraes, a large land and mine owner and part-
ner of Vianna, constituted a second source of military power. Frei 
Francisco Menezes, an enterprising priest involved in slave smuggling 
with Vianna, also lent his armed slaves and Indians to the emboaba 
22 force. 
The emboabas, a new middle group with commercial functions such as 
selling slaves and controlling the vital food-stuffs trade in Minas Ger-
ais 1 attracted the military classes, the mameluco and Indian mercenaries. 
The third element of the military classes, the armed slaves, were tied 
to leaders of this middle group which included land and rn:iile"owners. The 
monopolists, therefore, had the money to pay the mercenary milita.ry 
classes and the fazendeiros, including clerics, commanded armed slaves. 
The analysis of these two conflicts in the era of incipient Brazi-
' lian nationalism illustrates the concepts introduced in the first three 
chapters. In both the Dutch 1-ras and the Emboaba affair the soldiers re-
cruited on all sides 1-rere local forces. Jose'"Fernandes Vieira, leader of 
the 'Brazilians ~gainst the Dutch, led African, Indian and mulatto troops 
recruited in Pernambuco and Paraiba. Andr~Vidal de Negreiros, the first 
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line commander from Bahia, was born in Para:!ba and led soldiers from 
that area even though they were first-liners stationed in Bahia. 
In the Emboaba conflict Manuel Nunes Vianna led mamelucos and In-
dian mercenaries recruited by the old soldier of the first 1 ine, An-
~nio da Silva. The priest Frei Francisco, a rancher and miner, along 
1'\J 
with Pascoal Guimaraes, the other prominent rancher involved with Vianna's 
commercial ventures, provided armed slaves to augment the mercenary 
forces. All these emboaba military forces were recruited locally as were 
the forces recruited for the paulista defense. 23 
Not only were the military classes involved in these two conflicts 
locally recruited but they were also controlled by new middle groups 
which profited by confiscation of previous owners' properties. These 
new middle groups performed semi<-commercial or fllll co!TlJTlercial functions 
from which they amassed fortunes and from which they were able to pay 
mercenary military forces. The Brazilian leader in the Dutch war was a 
mulatto whose Dutch-granted tax-gathering contracts had brought him a 
large personal fortune. This fortune became endangered when the Dutch 
recalled all debts and tax levies. Vieira attracted mercenary m·nitary 
forces and, reinforced by mercenaries and first lines from Bahia, expro-
pril'lted Dntch properties ann escaped the threatened .Dutch foreclosures. 
He and the first line leaders, ingratiating themselves ~Qth the Portu-
guese king, later received lucrative appointments in the Empire. 
During the Dutch occupation of Pernambuco the Brazilians came into 
close contact with a people of different race, religion, language and 
culture. It provided the first opportunity for the Brazilians to assess 
their own way of life. There were few intermarriages between the Dutch 
and Brazilians. Neither the Dutch or the Brazilians learned e8ch other's 
language, relying on Jewish interpreters. During this time of assessment 
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the Brazilians began to develop a feeling of n~t:i.onalism. They began to 
realize that they liked their culture, although as long as Nassau ruled 
them gently they remained relatively compliant. 
During this era of incipient Brazilian nationalism the military 
classes-constituted an amorphous, fluid, unstable mass of mamelucos, 
Indians, mulattoes and freed and slave blacks. This group, as mer-
cenaries, revealed little corrorate consciousness and little indication 
thAt they had common interests as soldiers. They did not a.ct as a con-
solidated class with class interests. The middle groups completely con-
trolled their actions. The faint outlines of a tradition, however, did 
appear-a tradition of utilization by or alliance with civilian groups 
whose political and economic objectives required military force for im-
plementation. In later colonial times, from 1789 to 1817, a qualitative 
change appeared in the military-civilian relationships. The military 
classes became more organized and more comract and developed a sense of 
corporat-e identity, although civilian objectives still dominated the 
orientation of the rebellions in which they pArticipated. The military 
classes, however, developed objectives which happened to coincide with 
the civilian goals. · Racial conflict also played a greater role, due to 
the growth of the mulatto population, whose integration in Brazilian 
colonial society was blocked by the prejudicial policies of the Portu-
guese imp~rial officials. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE ERA OF DEVELOPING BRAZILIAN NATICNALISM 
The Inconfid~ncia Mineira 
During the eighty-one years from the Emboaba affair to the Incon-
confid~ncia Mineira in 1789, Brazil changed and grew froM a marginal and 
neglected colony to Portugal's most prized and lucrative possession. 
Though no formal act by the king raised Brazil to vice-royal status, af-
ter 1720 Brazil's highest colonial officials carried the title vice-roy. 
The gold discoveries in Minas G"'rais and the need to defend southern 
Brazil from Spanish incursions transfered the seat of power and impor-
tance from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro which became the capital in 1?63. 
The Portuguese also initiated a stricter, more centralized control over 
Br<'zil, especially in Minas Gerais, to tax the gold product' on and con-
trol the population. The local autonomy enjoyed by the c~aras munici-
paia (municipal council~ almost disappeared. Their powers were absorbed 
by the governor-general, who was ::!lso the capitania's commanding offi-
cer, capit"a'o-mor, and the Intendant of Hines who was directly respon-
s:lble to the· Crown. Laws forbade mulattoes and blacks to carry arms and 
to wear clothes comparable to those of whites. Men of color and those 
married to women of color could not hold pub~ic office. 
Portuguese law and policy oppressed 3razilians not only socially but 
also economically. During the time of the Pqrtuguese Restoration (1640) 
Portugal tied herself commercially to England under grossly unfavorable 
15 
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terms. The alliance solidified during the time of Cromwell and especially 
the English Restoration, when Charles II of England married Catherine, 
daughter of Joao IV of Portugal. This dependant relationship with Eng-
land ruined Portuguese agriculture and industry. On December 27, 17031 
John Methuen, the English ambassador in Lisbon, and Pedro II ratified the 
Methuen Trea.ty which opened Portuguese ports to English commerce and 
granted speeial terms to English cloth merchants.1 The clothes of Braz-
ili.an slaves came from England. The wheat of Brazilian bread passed 
through English hands first. 2 From 1703 Brazilian gold bouth Portug!'ll's 
food and clothes, built her lavish royal and religious houses, maintained 
her sumptuous emb~ssies in Europe and married her infantas into the rich-
est and most prestigious European royal families. To ensure control of 
this most valuable colony Portugal instituted a regime of strict and 
severe taxation and control. 
Revolts exploded in various parts of Minas Gerais throughout the 
lflth century.in respons to Portuguese repression. In 1715 the Revolt 
1'\ 
of Morro-Vernelho shook the capitania. In 1719 a group of paulistas, 
led by Domingos Rodrigues do Prado, 'killed the judge and expelled the 
capit~o-mor of the city of Pitangui. The governor-general of Minas, 
how~ver, soon restored his authority. The revolf- of 1720 involved a 
prestigious group of men in Vila Rica, the cApital. The leader, Jose 
Felipe dos s~ntos, hanged on the gallows and was qu~rtared. The mili-
tary le~der, Field Marshal Pascoal da Silva, merel:r received a repri-
mand. The Crown forbade constru~tion of hat Rnd cotton cloth factories 
and prohibited construction~ sugar and wheat farms in Minas GerAis, 
fearing the a~ricultural and industrial projects would drain manpower 
from the mines. It also attempted to raise taxes on the already much 
reduced gold production. " In response to this repression the ~on,iura~ao 
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de_Curvelo of 1755 agitated ·the whole area.3 
International influences had created an acute sensitivity to the 
Portuguese injustices and tyranny. A numerically small but important 
class of intelligentsia had developed in Brazil. This class included 
youn sons, ma-~y of them nmlatto, of the BrazHian aristocracy who had 
studied in London, Paris and Coimbra. The word "freedom", based on the 
concepts and ideas of the European propertied middle class, echoed 
throughout Brazil as it did in the United States and Europe. The success 
of the English colonies of North America in 1783 heartened Brazilians 
who longed to free their country from imperial Portuguese rule. On 
October 21, 1786, a young mineiro (from Minas Gerais) expressed his 
frustration .. a.;td .agony to Thomas Jefferson: 
I am a Braziiian and you, sir, know that my disgraced country 
groans beneath a terrible enslavement that becomes more in-
supportable since your glorious independence, because the 
barbarous Portuguese leave noth:!ng undone to make us more 
unhappy each day, fearful that your exam,..·le Might be imitated.4 
The ideas of the French Revolution, especially those of the Ency-
clopedists of pre-Revolutionary France, influenced Bahian intellectuals 
and working classes as well as the mi~eiro intelligentsia. Freemasonry 
spread rapidly in pre-Independence Brazil (1750-1222). Lod.~e5 · -;.rere es-
tablished first in :Sahia, then in Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sao 
Paulo. The leaders of all three rebellions analyzed in this chapter were 
masons (pedreiros livres) whose ideas of freedolll and political emancipa-
tion linked them to an internat~.onal movement which culminated, not in 
the French Revolution of 1789 nor in the 1848 revolut1ons, but in the 
Versailles treaties of i919-21. 
One of the main reasons for the failure of the rebellions of 1789, 
1798 and 1817 would lie in the illiteracy and unrreparednes~ of the 
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Brazilian people to follow their more enlightened and bolder leaders. 
The first printing press entered Brazil with Joio~ Prince Regent of 
Portugal in 1808. A royal letter of April 26, 1730, prohibited the 
delivery of ma.il by land in Brazil to prevent communication among the 
capitanias and villages. The Crown allowed the use of only two highways 
in and out of Minas Gerais to control. taxation more effectively. Public 
schools did not exist in Brazil and a st~ict censorhip of imported lit-
erature maintained the colony in a state of illiterAcy and ignorance. 
The illiteracy of the population reflected the oprression of at least 
half of the population v.rhich lived in slavery.5 Portuguese officials 
distrusted Braz.ilians~ esrecially ~ulattoes, whom they refused to pro-
mote beyong the post of second lieutenant. The go'rernor of Minas Geraj_s, 
by controlling the municipal camaras, prevented nationalist political ex-
pression. 
Economic oppression increased between 1750 and 1789. The taxes 
paid by gold producers and others in Minas Gerais grew proportionally 
heavier. Although the tax was 20% of all gold production, a minimum 
A 
of 100 arrobas had to be paid each year. It became harder to pay the 
minimum because the production of the mines declined annually. This 
situ~tion led the governor o~ Minas Gerais to institute a practice known 
as the derrama, a forced collection of all back taxes. Between 1774 and 
1785 the average annual tax paid on gold production was only 68 arrobas. 
In 1789 the governor of Mi~as Gerais, therefore, planned a derrama to 
collect the arrob~s of gold he ~nd the royal officiAls determined that 
the Brazilians owned the royal treasury. 
In 1788 a group of mineiros, therefore, hegan planning the l~-
"' fidencia Mineira, a rebellion against the ?ortuguese officials in Hinas 
Gerais and ~lio de Janeiro. . They envisioned not only freedom for Brazil 
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but the establishment of a republic as well. The conspirators of this 
rebellion hoped to initiate their revolt on the day the governor-general 
had set for the derrama, Harch 23, 1789. They expected the oppressed 
people to join them in an uprising against the officials to free Brazil 
from Portuguese rule. The revolution, how·ever, never surpassed the plan-
ning state, for the governor-general, warned of the s.edtion, suspended 
the derrama and on May 7, 1789 arrested those named by his informant, 
... 
Joaquim Silverio dos Reis. 
Both civilians and militJry officers were arrested. iight first-
line offieers With the rank of captain to colonel, including the com-
mander of the royal cavalry who was also second in command of all mili-
tary troops in Minas Gerais, suffered arrest and qu8stioning. Four se-
cond lieutenants Here also apprehended and tried for planning the revolt. 
Five priests and six university graduates (bachar;is) who held various 
posts of authority in the capitania also were convicted of treason and 
sedition. 6 All the conspirators 1vere initiates in the masonic lodge in 
Vila Rica. Although the rebels did not know all of the other collabor-
ators, there t-rl?re several pivotal figures. It wAs difficult, therefore, 
to prove -who the leaders really , .. ,ere when the Vice-Roy began the prose-
cution. 
On March 15, 1789 dos :leis, a PortuguesP-r·orn colonel of the cavalry 
of C-·mpos Gerais, had informed the Visconde de .Barbacena, governor of 
Minas Ge,rais, of the f~lanned insurrection and for one month continued to 
spy on the rest of the conspirators. On April 19, 1789, dos Reis for-
mAlly signed a letter of denunciation revePling all he knew about the 
planned rebellion. Dos R.eis had returned to his regiment at Campos 
Gerai in February only to find that it had been disbanded. He uttered 
some bitter and traitorous words which his S!'lrgeant-mor (executive 
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officer), Luiz Vaz de Toledo, over-heard. Vaz invited Silverio to join 
in the rebellion planned by a group of prestigious men, including Tomas 
Ant~nio Gonzaga, the royal judge of Minas Gerais, and the commander of 
the cAvalry in Vila ~ica and second military commander of the capitania, 
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco de Paula Freire de Andrada • 
.,... 
Besides the disbandment 6f his regiment, Silverio had another mo-
tive for being interested in a rebellion against the Portugue~e offi-
ci-'lls. Not only did the Portuguese tax th~ gold production of the mines, 
but they taxed travellers who used the two highways of the capitania 
and als0 charged tolls on river bridges.8 The governor left the collec-
tion of these tolls to the vc,rious first-line m:ilitary units, usually 
the cavalry. In his derrama the governor had called for all b~ck taxes 
/ 
owed by his first-line officers. Silverio, who had held what was called 
a li.oad Contract (Contrato das :Sstradas), owed a large amonnt from his 
tax-gathering activities on the roads and bridges of Minas Gerais. He 
did not have the necessary sum nor did all his property and good value 
the amount required.9 By the services rendered to Barbacena, however, 
Silverio escaped prosecution and was relieved of his debt. 
Four other conspirators, all of them commanders of cavalry troops, 
cooperated with the royal officials during the investigations. These 
were Field Marshal In;cio Correa Pamplona, Colonel Francisco AntSnio 
de Oliveira Lopes, Colonel Domingos de Abreu Vieira and Lt. Colonel 
Bas{lio de Brito Malheiro de LC~go. All were probably involved in tax-
gathering activities and probably ov.red back taxes to the government. 
Freire de Andrada, the second in military command of the capitania, had 
probably entered into the tax-gathering business also, disposing as he 
did of cavalry troops. The Vice-Roy of Rio de Janeiro, Dam Luis de 
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Vasconcelos e Sousa, and his legal staff condemned 11 of the 21 prisoners 
to death, among them Freire de Andrada. In a letter dated October 15, 1790, 
Queen Maria I of Portugal, however, C8rnmuted the death sentences to exile.10 
Cla'udio Manuel..:_da Cos'ba, one of the poets involved 1n ,the rebellion, com-
mitted suicide in his prison cell in Vila Rica. Some historians believe 
that the governor of Minas Gerais had been involved in the revolt through 
da Costa and had him killed. 
The alleged leader of the planned revolt was Second ~ieutenant 
/ ..... (alferes) Joaquim Jose da Silva Xavier, nicknamed Tiradentes (Tooth-Puller). 
He 1-ras the only conspirator who confessed to having planned sedition and 
who suffered the death sentence. Having excused his colleagues from blame 
and having claimed all responsibility for the planned rebellion, he was 
beh9aded and quartered on April 21, 1792. 
His life and fate vividly illustrated the conditions which induced 
Brazilian-born military men, especially mulattoes, to participate in civ-
ilian-military rebellions. Orphaned at the age of seven Xavier earned 
the nickname Tiradentes during the time he wandered over Bahia, Minas 
Gerais and Rio de Janeiro selling cloth, cheap jewelry and pots and pans. 
Be also pulled teeth and, aspiring to the title of Doctor, liked to 
think of himself as a dentist. He also tried mining, but failed since 
he disposed o~ too little capital for deepmining. He was a mulatto, one 
of that displaced and discriminated group whosP position in Brazil be-
came increasingly marginal toward the end of the 18th century. His lover's 
f8ther, citing Tiradentes• mulatto c~lor, denied his request for marriage.11 
Through his brother who was a priest Tiradentes became acquainted with 
books and aspired to join ~he intpll~ctual circles of Vila Rica. In 1?81 
Tiradentes enlisted in the cavalry regiment at Vila Rica. His record 
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revealed excellent service, although he had never been rew~rded for his 
competency by promotion. He remained at the rank of second lieutP-nant. 
Alrnir de Oliveira, histo~ian of the Inconfid~cia }1ineira, quotes an ex-
cerpt from the interrogation of Tiradentes; 
Ever since Tiradentes entered into the army, he has given 
valuable and dauntless service in the face of much danter, 
but has always been forgotten :in promotions ••• while others 
••• who had been his subordinates reached the rost of Lieuten-
ant and beyond ••• l2 
Tiradentes had a vision of Brazil's future, emancipated and pro-
gressive, which illuminated the objectives of the Inconfid~ncia: 
To establish a University at Vila Rica 
To establish a Republic with parliamentary government 
To construct factories 
To give personal freedom to all citizens regardless of color 
To disband the paid troops since every citizen had the obli-
gation to defend his co1mtry 
To free commerce and mining from excessive taxation.13 
He spread his ideas freely, openly discussing "Republican" Brazil and 
the imminent destruction of royal tyranny. Although a sertanejo (one 
from the backlands) he had made several suggestions concerning the ur-
ban development of Rio de Janeiro to the Vice-Roy who ridiculed them. 
·"' Joao VI begAn those projects when he arrived in Rio. By assuming re-
sponsibility for the planning of the rebellion, Tiradentes revealed 
his marginal status and his desire for recogniti~n and prestige. 
P. Pereira dos Reis, a historian of colonial Brazil, assessed Tira-
dentes, saying that 
••• the alferes Joaquim Jose attributed to himself all responsibi-
lity for the rebellion, exempting all the rest of his companions 
of whatever fault ••• and besides confronting adversity, injustice 
and death with stoicii~' spilled his blood as a martyr for Braz-
il's independence •••• 
8.3 
The InconfidGncia Mineira revealed some major characteristics of 
the colonial Brazilian military calsses. Twelve of the 21 arrested 
and cr.nvicted were military men, eight of which held the rank of cap-
tain or above including the second-ranking military commander in the 
capitania, the first being the governor-general. The paid military 
troors (first liners) performed certain semi-commercial functions--
tax-gathering--which involved their commanders in political and fis-
cal m~tters. The governor-general of Minas Gerais was also the command-
ing officer of the capitania. The planned rebellion against the royal 
officials, therefore, v-ras not only a civilian uprising but also a mili-
t.'3ry insurrection because of the dual nature of the governorship. The 
I( 
lower-ranking officers involved >-rere alferes, among whom was Joaquim 
,... 
Jose da Silva Xavier, a competent mulatto who had been denied promo-
tion. His conduct 1,.;ras characteristic of :individuals of marginal sta-
tus. He .attempted to create a new, more prestigious role for himself 
by espoustng natj_onalism and becoming a leader of the or:rressed group. 
Brazilians glorify his sacrifice and honor it as the peerless Indepen-
:ience story. 
,., 
The Conjuraeao de Bahia 1798 
The population of Minas Gerais revealed little sympathy ;vith the 
·"" conspirators of the Inconfidencia Mineir~. The majority had not been 
born in l-Unas Ger<lis and had little interest in the political future 
of Brazil. The difficulties of communication at the time and the great 
·distances preYent8d the unification and synchronizatbn of actic-n. The 
,.. 
ConjuraC(ao de Bahia, a planned but never executed rebelli0n, occurred 
in 1798. It revealed that the mulatto tailors and soldiers of Salva-
dnr, Bahia, had made progress in uniting for a common politicdl 
purpose. 
,J 
The events of the Conjura~ao Baiana of 1798 clearly revealed colo-
nial Brazil's social, economic and political limitations. They also 
clearly exposed the complexity of the relationship between civilian and 
solnier. The marginal mulatto soldier made common cause with an intel-
ligentsia and a mulatto mi~dle class. This middle class, whose advance-
ment the Portugu8se rule blocked,· performed commercial l'lnd Rrtesa.nal 
functi-:ns. 
Throughout colonial Brazil PortLlgue.'?d taxati'ln stunted BrazHian 
economic development. The major levies were the follow~ng: 
Vintena--20% of value of the exportation of brAzil-wood paid in 
--- cash to Crown 
Quinto--20% of value of pearls, precious stones, gold and other 
metals, paid in kind to Crown 
Dizima--lO% of the value of fishing catches, paid in cash to Crov..'tl. 
Siza--'7% of the sale of all merchandisE~ paid to Crown 
'biZiiiia--10% of value of goods brought to Brazil by foreign mer-
chants, even if taxes had been paid in Lisbon ~{zim~--lO%.of value of all merchandise exported to Portugal from 
Brazil, paid to Crown in cash 
Redizima--10% of all value of merchandise exported to Portugal from 
Brazil, paid to the captain of the ship 
Iniciais--local taxes collected by the alcaides-mores (military of-
ficers) at their discretion-·-
Consulado--10% of all merchandise.imr-orted into Brazil, paid to 
Crown in cash 
Ad V-"llorem--10% on all sale of goods 
Voluntaries--forced collect:'ons for certain special occasicns such 
as royal marriages or construction in Portu-
gal (to rebuild Lisbon the city cf Salvador 
alone had to pay 3,ooo,ooo cruzados over a 
period of 30 years.) 15 
The Portugups~ practice of granting commercial monopolies to cer-
t~in Portuguese merchants, mostly of New Christian origin, limited Braz-
ili~n ccmmerce and condemned the mass of Bahian to penury'. Food prices 
skyrocketed during the second half of the 18th century. Monopolists con-
trolled the salt, cooking oil and meat supplies. In the 1790's meat rose 
to 600 r~is per arrob?, inciting the people and soldiers, states Af . 
.... 
Fuy, historian of the Conjura.l(_ao de Bahia, 
••• to invade the slaughter-houses of Salvador, Bahia, taking 
by force the meat stored there and even stealing it from the 
hands of the slaves of the royal officials in the streets, l6 
alleging that the "ricos" were no better than the people ••• 
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Portuguese royal officials burdened the people with multiple taxation. 
Portuguese merchants harrassed them with monopC'ly prices and maintained 
the sug.o:~r planters of Bahia in debt. The planters required im;-orted 
goods whose value perennially exceeded that of their sugar crops. By 
1?98 the merchants and royal officials in Bahia maintained a severe 
rolitic?l and economic regime. 
The ideas of the French Revolut5.on influenced Bahi-9 much more in 
1798 than they had Hinas G-~rais in 1789. The intelJ_igentsia, including 
many ro~ .. u~rful individuals, meeting in literary and secret org<mizations, 
discussed the economic potential of a free, independent and politically 
liberal Brazil. Evidence indicates that the French participated in se-
d~tious activities in 1797 in Bahia. In July of that year Connodore 
Larcher of the French frigate La Pr~~u~ arriv~d in Bahia and ingra-
tiated himself by his charm and intellectual attainment with the m0st 
prominent figures of Salvador. Among these x-rere Padre Francisco Agos-
tjnho.Gomes, Joseda Silva Lisboa (economist), Cipriano de AlmeidA Bara-
ta, popular surgeon and advocate of eqllality and freedom, and Francisco 
Honiz Barreto, Latin grammar teacher.. Both Bar~ta and Barreto became 
leaders in the Conjuraq~o de Bahia. The governo'r-general assigned Lieu-
"' tenant Hermogenes de Aguilar Pantoja of the second regiment of the first 
line to accompany the Frenchman and watch his movements. Pantoja also 
.. 17 
was a leader of the Conjura~ao. An English officer arrived in Salvador, 
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boarding at the house of Sargento Joaquim Antonio da Silva, one of the 
~ ~ 
conspirators of the Conjura<(_ao. He frequented the house of Joao de Deos 
Nascimento, one of the rebellion's fo~r leaders, and discussed with visi-
tors the military arid political situation of Europe. He also advised 
them about the formation of a revolutionary army.18 
The pardos of Salvador, representing two-thi:rds of the city's 
population, chafed under oppressive Portuguese rule.~9 Though Portuguese 
officials opened municipal posts to mulattoes in Bahia in 1774, prejud-
ice still effectively blocked pardos from social and politic:=~l integra-
tion. The goals of the Conjurat~o clearly revealed the situation: 
••• to erect the continent of Brazil into a Republican 
government, free and independent, attempting a rebel-
lion of' the people, calling the slaves with a voice of 
freedom ••• with the viewpoint to open all posts 1 public 
offices and honors to pardos and pretos of ability 
without distincti·:n according to color ••• and to aug-
ment the pay of the military classes ••• and to open all 
ports to all commerce of the world ••• and to establish 
factories and manufacturing Without depending on Por-20 . tugal.... · 
Manoel Faustino dos Santos Lira, a freed pardo slave vitally involved in 
the planned uprising, expressed the goals of the conspirators succintly 
during the formal inquir,y: 
••• to reduce Brazil to a government of equality participating 
in it whites, pardos and blacks without distincti0n of color 
. I 
only of capacity to serve, expending the public treasury ••• to 
pay the military2froops and execute the necessary transactions 
of the State •••• 
On August 121 1798, posters appeared fixed in various places through-
out the city of Salvador. The ~rds on the posters irere inflammatory and 
seditious. · Ruy quotes one of these documents: tiArise, illustriog.s and 
powerful people of Bahia; it is the time of our liberty and equality ••• 
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you must proclaim your revolution and free yourselves of royal 
tyranny ••• 22 , 
·"' The governor-general, Fernando Jose de Portugal, examined these rosters 
and found them full of spelling errors and written in unpracticed script. 
On August 12, the same day, the first suspect, Luiz Gonzaga das Virgens, 
soldier of the second regiment of the first line of Salvador, was arrested. 
The arrest panicked the other conspirators who desperately joined their 
forces to reecue Gonzaga from prison. On the night of August 25 Joao de 
Deos and Lt .• Aguilar, both with their colleagues, met at Dique Field out-
side Salvador to initiate the revolt. Three tonspirators, Joaquim Jos~ 
..-
de Sant'Ana, captain of the black militia. regiment, Joaquim Jose da Veiga, 
and Jost Joaquim de Siqueira, soldier of the First Regiment of the paid 
troops, betrayed their colleagues and informed the govermor of the meet-
ing. Colonel Alexandre Teotonio de Sousa united 40 soldiers and 100 
armed slav"'S and captured the rebels as they arrived at the field. 
Of the 34 Bahians arrested and prosecuted 24 were pardos, five of 
whom were members of the first line and three of the militia. These 
pardo soldiers cleo!lrly manifested characteristics of marginal personali-
ties. They complained that pardos received few military and public 
office promotions and even fewer pay raises. Five of the pardos of the 
first and second lines were tailors and artisans. The Portuguese sys-
tern of commercial control and the praGtice of hiring out skilled slaves 
severly limited the artisans' possibilities for economic advancement. 
Ten of the conspira.tors were skilled par4o slaves whose masters expro-
priated their earnings. Five white soldiers of the first line joined 
the conspiracy. They 1~ere joined by five white bureaucrats and artesans 
and two surgeons, one of 1.;rhom was a pardo. These white members of the 
conspiracy served as the intellectual b~se of the uprising. They 
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performed the functions of an intelligentsia struggling for national li-
beration. The classific~tirn of the 34 prosecuted conspirators were: 
5 pardo tailor-soldiers (three of the first line and two of 
the second line) 
3 pardo soldiers of the first line 
5 white soldiers of the first line 
10 pardo slaves (five tailors) 
1 pardo surgeon 
1 white surgeon 
2 pardo bureaucrats 
2 white bureaucrats 
4 pardo tailors 2 3 1 white tailor 
The military leader of the sedition was Lt. Aguilar, a white member 
of the Second R8giment of the first line. The civil leader was Francis-
,.J 
co Moniz Barreto de Aragao, a white professor of Latin grammar in Jacobina, 
the most populous town of the Bahian interior. The Portuguese officials, 
however, never discovered the supreme leader. According to Ruy, 
As f~r as the chief of the rebellion was concerned, the one from 
whom the civiL an and military leaders received orders, nothing 
was known, nothing transpired, nor was information sought in the 
inquiry or the investigation. It was encught for the authorities 
to punish the poor mulatto soldiers and tailors ••• l4 
The Portuguese officials of Salvador hanged four conspirators•-
,.. 
Joao de Deos do Nascimento, a 24 year-old pardo tailor and squad leader 
of the Second Hilitia Regiment; Lucas Dantas de Amorim Torres, a 24 
year-old dark pardo and member of the Second Regiment of the Infantry; 
Lui.z Gonzaga das Virgens, a ·_36 year-old pardo in the Second Regiment of 
the Infantry; and Manoel Faustino dos S'3ntos Lira, a 22 year-old freed 
pardo who was a tailor and close friend of Jo~o de Deos. Aguilar, the 
military- leader of the planned insurrection, received a. six-month prison 
sentence and ~~rancisco Barreto, the civilian leader, w."ls sentenced to 
only one yePr in prison. 
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The method by which Portuguese officials had organized Bahia mili-
tarily--given the social and economic prejudice against pardos--created 
conditions favorable to organiz~d rebellions. The second-line units were 
homogeneous; each regiment contained men of the same color and trade. 
The pardo tailors of S3lvador, therefore, enlisted in the militia's 
second regiment and formed a nucleus for organized action.25 Every free 
man retween the ages of 18 and 60 belonged to one of the three military 
lines. The uprising was planned as a milit1ry rebellion; Joao de Deos 
and Lt. Aguilar hoped to unite the first and second lines to expropriate 
paver f'rom the J.oortuguese officials. Sant 1Ana, captain of the black mili-
tia. regiment, had also promised help. He was discontented with the cap-
tain-general's decision to nominate a ~·rhi te sargeant-mar to comma.nd his 
regiment, for he had aspired to the ;ost. 
The other soldiers of the first and second lines demonstrated cle2r-
ly their margtnal status within 1-ortuguese-ruled Bahia. Lucas Dantas 
<'lnd Gonzaga, the two soldiers who '..;ere ultimately hanged, had been re-
fused promotion because they were mulattoes.26 Jo~o de Deos, the squad 
leader of thfl second regiment militia, wes impatient for advancement. 
He h<>d fearlessly and provocatively propagated ideas of equality for 
all Men ~egardless of color. These thre~ men had close relationships 
1rlth a rising middle class which performed commercial and artesanal 
functi ,ns--the tailors--whose social and economic advancement the 1or-
tuguese blocked by prejudicial political and economic·meas~res. 
All the 34 conspirators, inclt1ding all the first-line soldiers, 
were born in Salvador or in adjacent villages. They were, then vitally 
interested in th':! local conditjons and ready to risk their lives to alter 
their m'<rginal status. In this Bahian revolt, therefore, the relation-
ship between soldier and citizen, especially between pardo soldier and 
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citizen was cleO!rly evident. A civilian rebellion necr->ssaril;r entail8d 
military insubordination because all free male citizens were members of 
the first, second or third lines and because the governor was also the 
capitania 1 s military col'TllllB.nder.~ Not until 1822, ho1-n=:ver, did Brazil 
gain her long-desired freedom from ?ortugal. 
cJ 
The Revoluyao Pernambucana of 1817 
None of the conspirators of the previously analyzDd rebellions, 
the Inconfid~ncia and the ConjuraX;o, had been able tn implement their 
objectives. In 1Rl7 a group of Pernambucans, however, ~lanned and coer-
d:i.nated their activities so effectively that they ;.•ere able to institute 
for a short time a republic in Pernambuco. As the nr-~tive Brazilian com-
mercial classes (merchants and artisans) gre-,.r numerically their pm._rer 
to initiate successful rebellinns·and institute alternative governments 
increased proportionately. In Fl7, five ye'"rs before 3razilians be-
gan their struggle for independence, Pernambucan merchants, soldiers 
ann intellectuals launched a revolt against the royal officials in Re-
cife. They dr;feat,ed the forces remaining loyal to the governor-gener-
al and captain-general, Caetano Pinto de r1iranda Montenegro, and in-
~tituted a republican form of government, albeit immature and weak. 
Recife, the capital of the Pernambucan captaincy, h~d a.biays har-
bored comrnercial popule1tions. ,The city comm~rci{llly controll>?d the 
neighboring agricultural sugar and cotton-growing regions of t?le Var-
D "'b R.' N Al zea, raral a, .lo Grande do 1 orte and agoas. Frequent disagreements 
<~nd inciden~,s r1etween the commercial sector and other interests marred 
the ci~y's life. 
As a result of the politic!'!l ann economic programs of the Marques 
<ie Pombal, by 1817 revolutionary propag:=tnda ann ideas spreAd throughout 
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Recife. Pombal's policies reflected Enlightenment concepts incll1ding 
the bourgeois liberal a+,ti tudes tow"rd property and commerce. He had 
expelled the Jesuits from Br~zil, chartered monopolist companies which 
strangled Brazil economically, aborted the embryonic industries of Braz-
il, encouraged masonry, and destroyed the aristocracy which had steadied 
the Portuguese throne by replacing it with a New Christian nobility of 
bourgeois capitalists. His second wife, Leonor E'.rnestina Daun, of an 
old noble German family, brought him the influence of German Protestan-
tism--individualism, democracy, commercial freedom. These ideas were 
added to his liberal-capitalist orient,ation which he had obtained in Lon-
don from 1739 to 1745 when he served as part of a diplomatic mission.27 
The Pombal reforms shoved Pernambuco into an economic abyss, The 
French, English and Dutch textile industries demanded vast amounts of 
r<nv cotton Hhich Pernambuco provided with an increasingly greater annual 
production. Since the agricultural resources of Pernambuco poured into 
the producVon of cotton as an export crop, food production dropped and 
the people suffered. Trade r,rith Rio Grande d9 Sul, which produced a sur-
plus of wheat, would have solved the problem, but Pombal prohibited all 
such interaction. He prefered to grant commercial monopolies to restrict 
further the food supply. Excessive taxation harrassed the people and the 
native Brazilian merchants and incited dissatisfaction and the revolu-
tianary spirit so prevalent in this era of social, .economic and political 
upheaval. 
On February 22, 1800, the enlightened bishop of Pernambuco, Azeredo 
Coutinho, reopened the Olinda Seminary which had closed when Pombal expel-
led its Jesuit masters. The. opening transformed the intellectual cli-
m:jte of Recife. The school allowed the sons of everyone, including New 
Christian merchants, to study there and abolished the requirement that 
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the students become priests. A new curriculum embued with liberal eco-
nomic and political ideas created a climate propitious for the develop-
ment of revolutionary aspirations. 
In this seminary young men studied under Padre Jo~o Ribeiro Pess~a, 
one of the three leaders of the Revolu~;o Pernal"!.bu~~ of 1817. Ribeiro 
A J\ had been a student and follower of Arruda Camara, a native of Goiana, 
who studied philosophy at the University of Coimbra and received his 
medical degree at the University of Montpellier in France. After being 
elected to the Lisbon Academy of Science in 1796, Camara had returned to 
Pernambuco v-rhere he gathered around him a circle of intellectuals which 
.... ,... 
came to be known as the Areopagus of Itambe. From this group, which in-
eluded Ribeiro, radiated the revolutionary propaganda that incited the 
city of Recife and its commercial and military leaders to rebellion on 
March 6, 1817. Upon retiring C~mara requested that his disciple Ribeiro 
••• end this ignorance and oppression of men of color ••• it must 
cease in order that soon they may be called to assume public 
office because Brazil will nPver progress if these natives 
are not integr01ted fully into the country's life ••• do not bend 
to the absurd and obscene aristocracy which will always thrm-1 
obstacles into the road of progress ••• with the monarchy or 
without her m~g of color must gain entry into the prosperity 
of Brazil •••• ! 
A Portuguese, writing after the Revolution had been defeAted and its 
leaders arrested and executed, revealed the status of the marginal mu-
lattoes of Recife who were wqoed by the Rebolution's leaders; 
••• the cabra.s, mulattoes and crioulos used to say that they were 
all equal to whites and they would not marry anyone except the 
noblest of •rhite ladies ••• now the prison of Recife contains mu-
latooes, freed slaves and crioulos TtJ"hom the provisional govern-
ment had made bureaucrats and military officers ••• these have re-
ceived three to five hundred lashes, some fainting, others dying, 
few of them groaning or screaming ••• They walk. very quietly now, 
tipping their hats to whites and in the narrow streets constrain 
themselves to pass whites most respectfully without touching tham ••• 29 
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The condition of the marginal mulattoes and native Brazilians wors-
f.l 
ened in 1808 when Prince Regent of Portugal, Joao, along ~th a coterie 
of 10,000 courtiers sailed into Salvador, Bahia, fleeing from Napoleon1 s 
invading armies. JCao rewarded his followers with government and mili-
tary rosts expropriated from Brazilians. The influx of impecunious but 
hnughty and sneering Portuguese fidalgos alienated Brazilians. The Por-
tuguese officers especially conducted themselves in an atrocious manner. 
,. 
A.J. Barrosa Lima, historian of the Revolu2ao Pernambucana, quotes a 
contemporary observation of the situation • 
••• the Portuguese military officers and soldiers are the ones 
who create and inflame the hatred of the Brazilians, insulting, 
arrogant and pompous, in all places they plant the seeds of hatred 
and rancor. The state of penury to which Portugal sank when she 
removed the commercial monopoly on Brazil, swept from her lands 
to Brazilian soil the illiterate, the parasites and the unem-
ployed, who claimed to have accompanied the king, because of 
loyalty and not because of their poverty •••• 30 
The Brazilian soldiers had more to compla.:.n about that just the arro-
gance of their officers. They did not receive their pay regularly. 
The French ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, informing his government 
of the Revolution, wrote that 
for one yeP.r the first line garrison of Pernambuco had.been 
infrequently and badly paid and poorly fed by the government 
officials ••• the Brigadier Sala:;oo:ar appointed by Nontenegro to 
take care of the business ••• committed the sturid injustice 
of proposing to tive to the troops their rations in money 
value and not in kind, planning to pay each soldier sixteen 
soldos for each sack of madioc allotted to them <Then the 
market price Of the mandioc was 50 SOldos for 8?Ch sack.31 
Masonic activity influenced the course of the ~evolucao Pernambu-
cana. From 11310 when the first lodges appeared in Recife to 1817 
the number of masonic lodges nml tip lied rapidly. All lodges 1vere im-
bued with the exciting idea of the emancipation of Brazn. 32 A 
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Domingos did not neglect the social and intellectual opportunities 
which London offered. He met the members of the elegant clubs and lit-
erary associations thCJt abounded in London. Domj_ngos met the Venezuelan 
exile, General ?rancieco Miranda, whose great vir:;ion of freedoJTJ for Latin 
America inflamed the youthful and ambitious Brazilian. Domingos became 
a m,'lson in Lo~do11 an<;i through him the lodges of Recife received 
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encouragement and support from English masons. Martins maintained a 
home in Recife and commuted between there and London. After an Q~for-
tunate event involving Martins• financial transactions in London, Mar-
tins returned permanently to Recife. He attracted the leading intellec-
tuals of the city Who planned a revolution throughout Brazil. E0ch cap-
itania would be linked by masonic leaders who wculd consider .:\.ecife the 
center.3h 
The Portuguese merchants of Recife, alarmed at the rumors of rebell-
inn Hhich circulated throughout the city, sent a letter tc· Honter,egro, 
the governor-general of_Pernambuco demanding that he take measures against 
an imminent Brazilian uprising. As was the case in Minas Gerais in 1789 
and in Bahia in 1798 milita.ry considerations overshadowed the 1vhole rr;ove-
ment. The highest Portuguese official in Pernambuco, Montenegro, was 
both governor and c0mmanding military officer. The Second Artillery Re-
giment of Olinda played such a dominant role in the execution of the re-
bsl1inn that it must be considered the source of power in the Revolution. 
Pressured by the Portuguese merchants, Montenegro called a meeting of all 
the generals of Pernambuco for March 6, 1817. He excluded the only Draz-
,., 
ilian-porn officer, Pernambucan 13rigadier Joao Peres Campello. The Braz-
ilian officers rose in anger at this insult. They protested the action 
in a joint letter signed by leading civilian patriots, inch,ding Martins. 
The Portuguese generals immediately imprisoned the militDry And 
civilian leaders in Fort Cinco Pontas, though they had as ~ret taken nc 
overt or seditious action. The Portuguese Bfigadier ¥12noel Joaquirn 
Barbosa do c~stro, commander of the Second Artillery Regiment• q~rested 
hig subordinate officer Captain Teot~nico; for seditious activities. 
I 1 
.... 
Captain Jose de Barros Lima, colleague of Teot~nico, speared Castro in 
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the heart. The ~~ole regiment rebelled and marched on Fort Cinco Pontas 
to free their military and civilian colleagues. An eyewitness describes 
the scene, declaring that 
the Brazilian officers and soldiers took the side of the 
patriots anrl seditious screams and shouts esc(!ped from every 
mouth. The revolution has started ••• The people fraternized 
with the armed forces and ••• the revolutionary movement assum-
ed a general character, raising the masses to delirious free-
dom. ~ithin a short time all of Recife was infested with 
this revolutionary ecstasy and the prisons ~..rere raided and 
opened and all prisoners frePd.15 
Me~rtins 1 freed from prison, was acknowledged ;s the supreme leader 
,'Jnd immediately assumed command of the troops. On Narch 7 Hartins led 
a great mass of people and soldiers to the governor's palace and entered 
llffi'\olested. The governor and his Portuguese officer corps had fled to 
Fort Brum. Within the palace a small group of patriots elected the 
members of a provisional government based on a corporate structure. 
Padre Ribeiro represented the clergy; Captain TeotS'nico, the military; 
~ / 
j)r. Jose Luiz de Mendon<(a, judiciary; · Colonel Manoel Correa de Araujo, 
agriculture; and !<1artins, commerce. The three most imrortant acts in-
stituted by the provis;nnal government clearly revealed the po,.,rer bases 
upon which it rested--the mASses, the military classes anr~ the commer• 
cial elements. Narcllio Teixeira de Lacerda, historian of the Revolution, 
reports that 
the major preoccupAtion of the patriots wAs to give to the nmr 
instituti,·m a profound democratic charac:.er in order to capti-
vate and hold the sympathies and trust of tlle people ••• taxes 
were diminished, salaries of sqldiers were increased, freedom 
of religion declared and the use of vos ':Second person formal7 36 . _./..., -prohibited. • • • · 
The revolution revealed the weakness, of\,the Portuguese government, 
the growing strength of the Brazilian leaders and masses and the 
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clear-cut coalition between dissatisfied military classes and the nascent 
commercial and intelligentsia groups. The/insurgents numbered 3,000 
first- and second-line soldiers. Only 120 of the Artillery, less than 
one-half of the contingent that guarded Hontenegro at Fort Brum, cap-
..,. -
tured Recife and forced Montenegro to embark on ~a F~lic~ on Harch 12 
for Rio de Janeiro.37 
On July 1, 1817, however, the new governor-general of Pernambuco, 
Luiz do Rego Barreto, took command of the royal forces. The short-
lived republic and its leaders were crushed by outraged Portuguese 
forces from Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. The insurgents had expected help 
from the masons of Bahia, but the latter reneged on their promise. Up-
risings agitated the whole Northei'lst, but royal forces proved too strong 
and the patriot forces too disunited and weak for any successful move-
ment for independence. An insurrection simultaneously exploded in Por-
tugal, but the military and masonic leaders, including Gomes Freire 
de Andrade, grand-master of ?ortuguese masonry, were beheaded. Sebas-
N 
tiao Pagano, Brazilian historian, hints that the Portuguese and Brazi-
lian movements ,,rere planned by the same leaders against the Crown. 
In Brazil Padre Ribeiro committed suicide in the sugar plantation 
"Paulista, about 30 miles west·of Recife, where the Revolution's army 
made its last stand. II At this time Captain Teotonico had taken command 
of the movement, acting as both civilian and military leader.39 Martins, 
Mendon~a, Padre l1iguelinho, who had been ~ppainted Secretary of the In-
terior, Captain Teot6nico and Barros Lima were shot on June 12, 1817. 
Addressine his last words to his executio~er_,; Martins declared_, "Come, 
execute the orders of your sultan; I die for liber •••• n40 The priest 
accQmpa.nying Martins clapped his hands ov~r Mf!rtins' mouth, not allowing 
the intrepid Brazilian to, utter that most fearful of all words--liberty. 
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Before the Revolution the Portuguese merchants had fought fiercely 
against opening Pernambucan commerce even to Brazilians. The Brazilian 
merchants had bitterly resented this tyrarmy. Masonic ideas of liberty 
and free commerce appealed to them The Portuguese merchants of Recife 
demanded th~t the Crown punish the cnnspirators of the Revolution severe-
ly. They feared that the Pernambucans, having tasted liberty, would re-
bel ~men commercial monopoly was restored to the Portuguese. These mer-
chants.~~ jubilant at the victory of the royal a.rmy1 donated much money to 
the troops and financed city-wide celebrations for three days. They 
also offered two masses and benedictions each day in the cathedral of 
Corpo Cancto in Recife.41 
The drama of the Revolution clearly delineated a powerful coalition 
among the military classes of the first line, a disaffected middle 
class and an intelligentsia. The military elements were all Brazilians 
who suffered economic and professional re;pression at the hands of Por-
tuguese commanding officers. The midcUe class, comrosed of Brazilian 
merchants, performed commercial functions which threatened the commer-
cial monopoly of the Portuguese merchants. The intelligentsia educated 
the elite of the city and disseminated the nationalist ideas so vital to 
the formation of a revolutionary program. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
As Frederick J. Teggart pointed out in 192.5, classical historical 
writings closely resembled the structure of classic Greek tragedy in 
which the interest focused, not on the outcome, but on the processes 
of fate or character which determined the outcome.l The tragedian pre-
sented the contemporary situation and then retrogressed in time, ana-
lyzing the elements which crePted the condition 'pr9sented at the begirming. 
In. Oedi"US _}~e_:x;, for example, Sophocles presented the prophecy of the 
blinded king and then proceeded to narrate the tr3gic stor,r chronologi-
cally. HerodotQS 1 Greek historian of the PericlPan Age and honored as 
the father of history, presented his readers with the reality of Athens' 
ascendancy over the Persians and then returned to the past to search for 
exp1Anatj 0 ns of that dominance. Thucydides, the brilliant Greek his-
torian of the Peloponnesian ~·Jars, likewise pondered the processes by 
which two Greek city-states ferociously destroyed each other in fratri-
cidal wP.r and retr1rned to the origins of both peoples to trace the tra-
gic events. 
This thesis utilizes the same formula, presenting the contemporary 
political strQctu~e in Brazil and then retQrning to the colonial past 
to examine the development of the characteristics of the milita~- classes 
from 1500 to 181?. The objective is to uncover the roots or the processes 
by "''1ich the Brazilian Army developed into the politically dominant pm.,er 
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it is today. 
The classical Greek tragedians, especia 1 ly Euripides, implied that 
the human pArsonality Rnd its flaws and weaknesses drove man to his o~~ 
tragic end. He, therefore, sought to understand the processes by which 
they developed. The writer of this thesis believes th::J t the charac-
teristics of the Brazilian army deter ined their own political interests 
<md activitiAs. It appeared logical, therefore, to seek explanations 
for the contemporary Brazi i_ian Army's political dominance in an analysis 
of those characteristics that politicized the army and in an inquiry into 
the development of those characteristics. 
The writer believes that the development of institutions is a con-
tinuous, cultural process. The past vitally influences how the institu-
ti.~n reacts to new situations. This idea is the basis upon ~1hich the 
writer justifies linking the political dominance of the Brazilians' army 
of today with c0lonial developments. The process~s and characteristics 
developed in colonial times vitally shap'-"d the orientation of the growth 
of the Brazilian Clrmy as an institution. 
To effect this analysis the writer has examined the contemporary 
Jcc:zilian army's :'lction in the coup of 1964 and has discovered three 
characteristics which appeared to have politiciznd it. These factors 
are its regional characteristics, ethnic composition and its relati:-:n-
ship to a threatened, marginal or otherwise disaffected :niddle class. 
The unqerlying theory of the thesis, that historical development of insti-
tutions is continuous and unbroken, dictatFs that the origin and deve-
lopment of these characteristics lie in the colonial past. Since social, 
econ::lmic, political and military crises usually reve.'!l the characteris-
tics and functions of different com;--onents of a society, the writer 
chose ·fi,,e rebellions involving m::litafY classes in colonial Brazil for 
I 
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analysis. Each analysis attempted to indicate the relationship of the 
military classes to their civilian colleagues and to outline those· 
characteristics which politicized the military groups. 
Brazilian-born soldiers, mostly mulattoes and other kins of mestico, 
composed the colonial Brazilian m', litary classes. They functioned at 
first as mercenaries for the rural senhores and later, as they increased 
in numbers, enlisted in the military first line. The Portuguese social 
legacy of miscegenation created a Brazilian mestico population. Portu-
guese prejudice and fear of the native-born, however, prevented the in-
tegration of these mesticos into the imperial system. Portuguese policy 
officially barred the Brazilians from the officer corps until 1774; 
after that unofficial Portuguese prejudice functioned as effectively 
as the pre-1774 policy and created an immense reservoir of resentment by 
condemning the majority of Brazilian mulattoes to marginal status. This 
resentment helped politicize those mulatto soldiers and created conditions 
and attitudes propitious for subversive action. 
The regionalism so predominant in colonial 3razil helped politicize 
the military classes. The defense of Brazil overwhelmed the capacity of 
the Portuguese imperial government. The Crown, therefore, intorduced a 
feudal structure into colonial Brazil by granting huge tracts of land to 
certain men who executed both civil and military command in their areas. 
This practice continued into the captaincy era; the governor-general of 
a capi tania also held the title of captain-general. This unification o·r 
civilian and military leadership in one man sprang not only from the pe-
culiar structure of colonial Brazil but also from the Portuguese military 
('J 
legacy embodied in the ordenagoE),~ af~ns~, the Portuguese code of law 
applied to Brazilian colonization. The Wiification .of civilian and 
10.5 
military leadership assured that every civil uprising against the 
government would also entail military insubordination. All able-bodied 
free men in colonial Brazil served in the first, second or third lines. 
The structure of any organized uprising would, therefore, necessarily be 
military. 
The method of recruitment in colonial Brazil strengthened the re-
gional orientation of the military classes. In Portugal during the 
centuries-long struggle against the Moors, a system of local recruit-
. ~ 
r.~ent for local defense developed and was embodied in the ordena~oes af-
onsinas. In Brazil the garrisons of the citi.es included soldiers from 
the local area who, of course,. maintained an interest in local political 
affairs. 
The third characteristic which helped politicze the colonial 
Brazilian military classes was their relationship with certain disaffected 
middle classes whose status or position at one time or Another was threat-
ened by Portuguese policies. These groups believed they needed military 
force to protect themselves and implement their political goals. These 
middle chsses performed commercial or semi-commercial functions and 
included, in later colonial times, members of an embryonic intelligent-
sia. Often certain military officers who dis~osed of cavalry troops 
pe,rformed fiscal duties such as tax-gathering. 1\lhen civil officials re-
quired payment of these back taxes, the 'indebted officers often rebelled 
and were joined by certain disaffected civilian middle classes, either 
merchants or intellectual or both. 
This thesis suggests that the emphasis on the Brazilian civilian 
tradition, so lauded in contrast to the Spanish American military dom-
inance, h~s distorted Brazilian historiography and obscured the roots 
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of-the contempora~ Brazilian political-military crisis. A close scru-
tiny of the functional relationships among colonial Brazil's various 
classes revea.ls that civilian-military alliances, so dominant in con-
temporary Brazilian politics, germinated and developed in colonial times. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Frederick J. Taggart, Theory and Processes of History (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1960) 1 pp~ff:67. 
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